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INTRODUCTION 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most influential and crucial treaty in the 
nuclear weapons world.
1
 The NPT has 191 states parties, and more countries have ratified the 
NPT than any other disarmament agreements.
2
 The treaty divides states into the two-tier 
system: the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Only 
five states, the United States of America (US), Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (UK), France and China, are recognised as NWS in the NPT regime. 
The treaty gives different obligations depending on the tier of the states in the treaty. The 
NWS should not transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient while the NNWS should neither 
receive nor manufacture nuclear weapons.
3
 Also, the NNWS were obliged to accept 
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent the use of nuclear 
energy for military purpose, whereas the NWS were obliged to pursue negotiations on 
effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
4
 Although the object of Article VI of the 
NPT is not the NWS but “Each of the Parties to the Treaty”, the disarmament clause is 
recognised as an obligation for the NWS since only legal nuclear weapons are allowed to 
those NWS in the NPT regime. In 1995, the NPT state parties extended the Treaty’s initial 
lifetime of twenty-five years indefinitely. However, the NPT regime is facing many obstacles. 
Not only from the outside of the NPT regime by India, Israel, Pakistan and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but also from the inside of the NPT by the NWS and 
Iran. 
The purpose of the thesis is to identify illegal acts regarding the development of nuclear 
weapons by nuclear-armed states and prove that the current regime is not effective enough to 
meet the aim of the NPT. Some proposals which will prevent those unlawful acts also will be 
suggested in order to make the world a safer place from nuclear weapons. Nuclear-armed 
states can be defined as states that have a nuclear capacity to strike other states with nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, nuclear-armed states consist of not only five NWS in the NPT regime but 
also include, non-NPT nuclear powers, the DPRK, India, Israel and Pakistan. 
                                           
1
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moscow, London and Washington DC 
01.07.1968., e.i.f. 05.03.1970. 
2
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ (01.02.2019). 
3
 NPT, op. cit., Art 1 and Art 2. 
4
 NPT, op. cit., Art 3 and Art 6. 
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Obstacles from the inside of the regime are following. Although the NWS should not transfer 
nuclear weapons to any recipient, the US has sold its missiles to the UK.
5
 Also, the NWS 
should not encourage any NNWS to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, the US made an 
agreement which gives India de facto nuclear power status. These issues should be critically 
analysed whether they are against Article I of the NPT. 
Regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was 
concluded in 2015. The contents of the plan are that Iran accepts IAEA safeguard and the UN 
and other states withdraw their sanction on Iran. However, the US withdrew from JCPOA in 
2018.
6
 Since the JCPOA is not a treaty, withdrawal from it per se does not cause a legal 
problem. However, as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution calls upon all 
UN members to take appropriate actions to support the implementation of the JCPOA, the 
legal effect of the resolution should be analysed.
7
 
Although the NWS were allowed to possess their nuclear weapons under the NPT regime, 
they are not also free from illegal acts regarding nuclear weapons under international law. 
According to Article VI of the NPT, the NWS “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”. Most 
scholars, including Joyner, interpret that the nuclear arms race ended along with the end of the 
Cold War.
8
 However, some scholars maintain that a new nuclear arms race started in 2002 as 
the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty).
9
 As both the US and 
Russia announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 
February 2019, new arms race argument became more persuasive.
10
 If the nuclear arms race 
                                           
5
 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA). Washington DC 06.04.1963, e.i.f. 06.04.1963; Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement concerning the acquisition by the United Kingdom of the Trident II Weapon System under the 
Polaris Sales Agreement signed on 6 April 1963. Washington, 19 October 1982, Washington DC 19.10.1982, e.i.f. 
19.10.1982. 
6
 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Vienna 14.07.2015 (created), e.i.f. 18.10.2015 (adoption). 16.01.01 
(implementation); M. Landler. Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned. The New York Times, 
08.05.2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html (24.02.2019). 
7
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (UNSC Resolution 2231), 20.07.2015. paragraph 7. 
8
 D. H. Joyner. The legal meaning and implications of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. - G. Nystuen et 
al. Nuclear Weapons Under International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 410. 
9
 N. Tannenwald. The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? How Disarmament Fell Apart. – 97 Foreign Affairs 2018(6), 
p.20; Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation 
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Moscow 26.05.1972, e.i.f. 03.10.1972. (The US withdrawal 13.06.2002). 
10
 P. Stubley. Putin threatens to build new missiles after Trump pulls US out of Cold War-era nuclear weapons 
treaty. The Independent, 02.02.2019 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-russia-us-cold-
war-trump-nuclear-weapons-missiles-treaty-arms-race-military-a8759616.html (11.02.2019); Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Washington, D.C. 08.12.1987, e.i.f. 01.06.1988, expired 01.02.2019 
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has started again, this automatically constitutes the breach of Article VI of the NPT. 
Other NWS – China, France and the UK – also are not free from illegal conduct. All NWS 
have begun modernising and upgrading existing warheads and nuclear weapons deliveries. 
Those actions should be critically analysed whether they have breached the preamble and 
Article VI of the NPT which state the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. Even 
if the cessation of the nuclear arms race part has been satisfied by the NWS already, the 
nuclear disarmament part and the general and complete disarmament part of Article VI of the 
NPT should be analysed still. 
Obstacles from the outside of the regime are following. The DPRK has a unique position 
compared to other non-NPT nuclear powers since it was a former NPT member. 
“Article X of NPT stipulates that each Party shall have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardi[s]ed. This Article 
recognises that supreme interests of states are above the nuclear non-proliferation.”11 
The minister for foreign affairs of the DPRK, Ri Yong Ho, stated this during the General 
Debate of the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2017 to 
justify the development of nuclear weapons of the DPRK in the legal perspective. This speech 
included a vindictive comment for the speech where the President of the US, Donald Trump, 
mentioned total destruction of North Korea during the same session of the UNGA.
12
 War of 
words between two nuclear-armed states was enough to make the world tremble with fear of 
nuclear war. 
Fortunately, the relation between the DPRK and the US is much better now compared to the 
time when these speeches were delivered as two leaders of the states had two summits 
already.
13
 However, the second summit was ended without any agreement, and the DPRK 
still possesses its nuclear weapons, and it shows how difficult it is to solve the nuclear crisis. 
                                                                                                                                    
by the United States and expired 02.02.2019 by Russia. 
11
 Statement by Y. H. Ri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. General 
Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. New York. 23.09.2017. 
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/kp_en.pdf (01.02.2019). 
12
 Statement by D. Trump, President of the United States of America. General Debate of the 72nd Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly. New York. 19.09.2017. 
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/us_en.pdf (01.02.2019). 
13
 K. Liptak., J. Diamond. ‘Sometimes you have to walk’: Trump leaves Hanoi with no deal. CNN 28.02.2019. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/27/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-vietnam-summit/index.html (06.03.2019). 
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The DPRK case should be divided into two parts. One part is the legality of development of 
nuclear weapons under the NPT before its withdrawal. The other part is the legality of the use 
of previous nuclear assistance from other NPT members for the development of nuclear 
weapons after the withdrawal from the NPT. 
India, Israel and Pakistan have developed their nuclear weapons outside of the NPT regime. A 
treaty cannot make either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent unless it is 
customary law.
14
 Since those three states have never entered the NPT, they are not bound to 
the treaty. However, still, those states should develop their nuclear weapons in accordance 
with customary international law and treaties that they have entered. For example, all three 
states are members of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
15
 
Four de facto nuclear powers have appeared, and this has endangered the world with nuclear 
crises. One of the reasons that India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons was an 
unfavourable relationship between the two states. The military conflict is even continuing 
until today.
16
 The DPRK and the US exchanged furious condemnations to each other in 2017. 
Although the dialogue between the two states has commenced, it seems complicated to find 
an agreement as can be seen from the breakdown of the US and the DPRK summit in Hanoi 
in 2019. Israel still neither denies nor admits the possession of nuclear weapons. 
This study is important for all states in the world since the horrible destructive power of 
nuclear weapons is unprecedented, and it can actually lead the end of the history of 
humankind. If the world is safe from the nuclear weapons regardless of the illegal or anomie 
status in the nuclear weapons world, analyses on illegal acts of states under the NPT regime or 
whatsoever has no substantive values besides academic value for international law scholars. 
Some scholars, including Waltz, explain that if the cost of war is much higher than the 
possible gain, the war becomes less likely.
17
 Therefore, the world will be safer if more states 
possess nuclear weapons as it will increase the cost of war between more countries. However, 
this idea is based on an ideal state that decision makers of each state always make reasonable 
decisions. Therefore, a new NPT regime which can actually achieve nuclear disarmament 
                                           
14
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Vienna 23.05.1969, e.i.f. 27.01.1980, Art 34 and Art 38. 
15
 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). Moscow 05.08.1963, e.i.f. 10.10.1963. 
16
 H. Regan. et al. Pakistan says it shot down two Indian jets as Kashmir border crisis deepens. CNN, 
28.02.2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/27/india/india-pakistan-strikes-escalation-intl/index.html 
(06.03.2019). 
17 K. N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better. – 21 The Adelphi Papers 1981(171). P. 4. 
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under the participation of all nuclear-armed states and lead them to the general and complete 
disarmament is needed at the end. Until now, there is no universal treaty which binds all 
nuclear-armed states under strict and effective international control. To reduce the risk of use 
of nuclear weapons, the current NPT regime should be critically analysed, and amendments 
should be suggested to make up the shortcomings of the current NPT regime. 
The research questions are: have the NWS complied with the NPT and other international law 
regarding nuclear weapons matter? Have non-NPT nuclear powers complied with other 
international law regarding nuclear weapons matter? What kind of form and contents of a 
treaty can satisfy all nuclear-armed states, so all of them can join the treaty and achieve the 
world without fear of nuclear weapons? 
The object of the thesis is the NPT and other relevant treaties. The NPT and other relevant 
treaties will be examined to define whether nuclear-armed states have violated international 
law. For the proposal of new contents for the new NPT regime, the strengths of each relevant 
treaty and the policies of each state will be introduced. 
The primary source used in the thesis is the NPT. As secondary sources, relevant nuclear 
disarmament treaties, journal articles, books, and news articles were used. Especially for the 
status of the NWS’ nuclear weapons deliveries, some of the reports from the Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists were mainly used. The analytical legal method was used in general for most 
of the parts of the thesis, but the model approach was used in the last chapter to propose some 
new contents for the new NPT regime. 
The thesis is divided into four parts. In the first chapter, Article I and Article II of the NPT are 
examined. Article I of the NPT prohibits transference of nuclear weapons to any recipient and 
encouragement making the NNWS manufacturing nuclear weapons. Whether the missile sales 
between the US and the UK constitute the violation of the prohibition of transference of 
nuclear weapons is examined. Also, whether the reactions of the NWS of Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear weapon development constitute the violation of Article I of the NPT is examined. 
Article II prohibits the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Iranian nuclear crisis and the 
DPRK nuclear weapons developments are examined whether the two states have breached 
Article II of the NPT. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA is also examined. 
In the second chapter, Article VI of the NPT is examined. The author split Article VI into 
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three parts: cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the general and 
complete disarmament. The number of nuclear warheads, development of nuclear weapons 
deliveries, nuclear missiles defence system and nuclear weapon ban treaties are examined in 
the cessation of the nuclear arms race part to check whether the NWS have violated the law or 
not. Nuclear disarmament and treaty on general and complete disarmament are also examined 
for the same reason. 
In the third chapter, other international laws regarding nuclear weapons are examined. The 
legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international law is analysed with the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 Advisory Opinion (Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion) by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
18
 To interpret the intention of judges 
more correctly, all separate opinions from judges on this advisory opinion were examined. 
The use of nuclear weapons under the international humanitarian law and international 
environmental law also are examined whether it is possible to use nuclear weapons in 
accordance with international law. The principle of military necessity, the principle of 
proportionality, the principle of humanity and the principle of distinction were analysed in the 
international humanitarian law part. Developments of nuclear weapons by non-NPT nuclear 
powers were examined. Since the DPRK has a unique status as it has tested nuclear weapons 
after its withdrawal from the NPT, different criteria have been applied. 
In the last chapter, some new contents for the new NPT regime which will be concluded 
according to Article VI of the NPT were suggested. The theory that nuclear proliferation will 
increase the chance of peace will be critically examined first. After that, the specific details of 
the possible contents for the new NPT regime will be introduced. New NWS, linking the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), assurances of non-use and no first use, 
current nuclear-weapon-free zones, new withdrawal clause, the protection from nuclear 
terrorism by non-state actors and specific nuclear disarmament plan will be suggested.
19
 
I would like to thank Liisa, my family and supervisor René Värk for all the support for me. 
The following keywords characterise this thesis: disarmament, nuclear weapons, treaties on 
the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
                                           
18
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion, I. 
C. J. Reports 1996. 
19
 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). New York, 10.09.1996, not yet ratified. 
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1. NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS UNDER ARTICLE I AND II OF 
THE NPT 
The NPT contains three pillars: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and nuclear disarmament.
20
 Articles I, II and III of the NPT are related to nuclear 
weapons non-proliferation and safeguards. Articles IV and V of the NPT are related to the 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Article VI of the NPT is the only article which refers to 
the nuclear disarmament. Compared to the other pillars, the peaceful uses of nuclear 
technology part has worked well so far. Article IV states that all state parties shall have the 
right “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, and 
Article V ensures that all state parties shall have the right to benefit from any peaceful 
applications of nuclear explosions.
21
 However, the first pillar of the NPT has been a key issue 
in the nuclear community since some states are trying to violate the non-proliferation 
principle in various ways. In this chapter, the violation of the nuclear non-proliferation 
principle under the NPT by NWS and NNWS (including the former NNWS, the DPRK) will 
be analysed. 
1.1. Interpretation of Article I of the NPT 
Article I obliges each of the NWS parties: 
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon 
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 
Although there are plenty of issues for discussion in this article, the definition of the most 
important terms, nuclear weapons and encourage will be focused. 
 
                                           
20
 R. L. Pfaltzgraff, JR. The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. – 30, Fletcher Forum of World 
Affairs 2006(3), p.65. 
21
 G. Nystuen., T. G. Hugo. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. - G. Nystuen et al. Nuclear Weapons Under 
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 391. 
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1.1.1. Missile sales between the US and the UK under Article I 
There is no clear definition of nuclear weapons in the NPT. According to Willrich, the 
omission of the definition of nuclear weapons made it easier for the US to interpret nuclear 
weapons as only nuclear warheads, and not nuclear weapons deliveries.
22
 This 
ambiguousness made it possible for the US to sell missiles to the UK. The UK developed its 
nuclear warheads by its own, but essential part for the use of nuclear weapons, the missile, is 
prepared by the US. The lack of a definition also helped to obscure the fact that in the 
negotiations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) more or less accepted the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) sharing arrangements.
23
 Since there was no clear 
opposition regarding these matters at the time when those agreements were made, delimiting 
the definition of nuclear weapons as only nuclear warheads is correct. Therefore, regarding 
Article I of the NPT, missile sales between two states is not against the law. However, 
regarding the Polaris Sales Agreement between the US and the UK, it seems like both states 
have violated the preamble and Article VI of the NPT.
24
 
1.1.2. Reactions of the NWS to Indian nuclear weapon development under Article I 
India implemented its first nuclear bomb test in 1974. As it was revealed that the plutonium 
and heavy water used in the test were supplied by Canada and the US respectively, both 
countries stopped their nuclear energy assistance. After the first nuclear test of India, 
international society realised the necessity of a separate regime to check international nuclear 
proliferation, and therefore, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in 1975.
25
 India 
implemented further nuclear tests in 1998 and announced its possession of nuclear weapons. 
The UNSC condemned India with a resolution.
26
 The US imposed economic sanctions on 
India as well.
27
 Although China, France, Russia and the UK did not impose any national level 
sanctions on India, they also had not accepted India as the NWS.
28
 Along with Israel, 
                                           
22
 M. Willrich. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World 
Politics. – 77 Yale Law Journal 1968(8), p. 1474. 
23
 G. Nystuen., T. G. Hugo. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. op. cit., p. 387. 
24
 See infra Chapter 2.1.1. 
25
 D. Kimball., The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a Glance, Arms Control Association, 16.08.2017, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG (12.02.2019). 
26
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, 06.06.1998. 
27
 U.S. imposes sanctions on india. CNN, 13.05.1998. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/ 
(13.02.2019). 
28
 C. D. Wadhva. Cost of Economic Sanctions Aftermath of Pokhran II. – 33 Economic and Political Weekly 
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Pakistan and North Korea, India was not recognised as a nuclear power as they are not 
qualified to the definition of the NWS in Article IX paragraph 3 of the NPT since they have 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon after 1
st
 of January 1967. 
However, the situation had been changed as the US lifted its sanctions on India in 2001.
29
 
Furthermore, the agreement (US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement) which gives India de facto 
nuclear power position was signed in 2007.
30
 The key point of the agreement is that India 
would take IAEA safeguards of its civil nuclear facilities and the US agreed to have full civil 
nuclear cooperation with India. As military nuclear facilities are not under the control of 
IAEA safeguards, the agreement practically recognises India as nuclear power since the NPT 
regime stipulates that only the NWS are exempted from IAEA safeguards. The US persuaded 
NSG to grant the waiver to India from its existing rule, which forbids nuclear trade with a 
state which has not signed the NPT, and it was successful though there were some states 
which expressed their reservations.
31
 
The action of the US regarding the acceptance of de facto nuclear power of India might 
constitute the breach of Article I of the NPT. The meaning of encourage should be determined 
first. According to the US Legal, the term, encourage, means: to give courage to, to raise 
confidence, or to make confident.
32
 Some irrelevant words from Article I of the NPT were 
removed so the relevant contents for analysation can be seen more clearly. 
“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes (…) not in any way to 
assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture (…) 
nuclear weapons (…).” 
What is the definition of the NNWS? Although there is a clear definition of the NWS in the 
NPT, there is no definition for the NNWS.
33
 Considering the meaning of non- in English, the 
NNWS means all states except the NWS. Although a treaty does not create obligations for a 
                                                                                                                                    
1998, p. 1604. 
29
 U.S. lifts sanctions against India. CNN, 05.12.2001. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/12/04/india.us.defense/index.html (13.02.2019). 
30
 Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement). 27.07.2007, not yet 
ratified. 
31
 S. Sirohi. A win-win situation for India. BBC, 09.10.2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7650286.stm 
(13.02.2019). 
32
 Encourage Law and Legal Definition, US Legal, https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/encourage/ (12.02.2019). 
33
 The NPT, op. cit., article 9 paragraph 3. 
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third state without its consent according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), just being mentioned by the treaty without consent does not create any obligations 
for a third state.
34
 Moreover, in Article I of the NPT, the NWS part is mentioned with the 
phrase, to the Treaty, whereas the NNWS is just mentioned without the phrase. Therefore, 
third states, including India, which have not signed the NPT should be defined in a certain 
group, the NNWS, in the treaty. It can be argued that as the first part of Article I of the NPT 
used the term, any recipient whatsoever, the NNWS should be distinguished from this term, 
so the NNWS only includes the NPT member states while the term, any recipient whatsoever, 
should mean any states, including the non-NPT states. However, the reason for not using the 
term, the NNWS, was to prohibit the transfer to military alliances or groups of states.
35
 
Preventing transfer to non-state whatsoever was the purpose of the term. Therefore, the term, 
the NNWS, in the second part of Article I of the NPT should be interpreted as it includes non-
member states as well. 
The question is whether the US committed the breach of Article I of the NPT by encouraging 
India or other NNWS to manufacture nuclear weapons or not. The US stopped its nuclear 
energy assistance to India right after the nuclear weapon test by India in 1974. Moreover, the 
US imposed economic sanctions on India as a reaction for the Indian nuclear weapon test in 
1998. Considering those, the US did not encourage India to manufacture nuclear weapons. 
However, after three years from the announcement of possession of nuclear weapons by India, 
in 2001, the US acknowledged India as a de facto nuclear power outside the NPT regime by 
concluding the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. This action by the US in 2001 did not 
encourage India to manufacture nuclear weapons since India has manufactured nuclear 
weapons by its own will already before the recognition. There was no previous sign by the US 
that it would accept the Indian nuclear weapons development later, but the US only acted 
consistently trying to make India not to develop its nuclear weapons by various ways until it 
concluded the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement with India in 2001. Therefore, the 
conclusion of the agreement in 2001 cannot be interpreted as a stimulant for the Indian 
nuclear weapons production in 1998. 
                                           
34
 VCLT, op. cit., Art 34. 
35
 R. Popp. The long road to the NPT: from superpower collusion to global compromise. – R. Popp, L. Horovitz, 
A. Wenger (ed). Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. London and New York: Routledge 2017, pp. 
19-20. 
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However, the conclusion of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement can be applied to 
encouraging other NNWS to manufacture nuclear weapons. India became the first de facto 
nuclear power recognised by international society by joining the NSG without the entry of the 
NPT. The DPRK, which did not possess any nuclear weapons back in 2001, probably was 
carefully considering many other factors before it tested its first nuclear weapons in 2006. It is 
difficult to say that the conclusion of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement is the only factor 
of determination or continuation of the development of nuclear weapons by the DPRK. 
However, still, the agreement must be interpreted as a favourable factor for the government of 
the DPRK regarding developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, the US committed a breach of 
Article I of the NPT by concluding the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement which strongly 
affected the determination of the DPRK manufacturing nuclear weapons. 
Other NWS are also not exempted from this violation as they all accepted India entering the 
NSG with exceptional advantages. The UK, France and Russia supported the US-India Civil 
Nuclear Agreement. This can also be regarded as a violation of Article I of the NPT for the 
same reason that the US was charged. However, the heaviness of illegality should be 
examined differently as the US actively led the situation which ultimately gave India de facto 
nuclear power title. Unlike other NWS, China was not in favour of this case in the 
beginning.
36
 Although China reluctantly had accepted the waiver which made India entry for 
the international nuclear market, China did not stop the deal. Therefore, China also should be 
blamed for the violation of Article I of the NPT for encouraging other NNWS manufacturing 
nuclear weapons though the heaviness of condemnation on China should be much less than 
other NWS. 
1.1.3. Reactions of the NWS to Pakistani nuclear weapon development under Article I 
Pakistani nuclear weapons development in 1998 also should be analysed with the US-India 
Civil Nuclear Agreement. As Pakistani nuclear test preceded the conclusion of the US-India 
Civil Nuclear Agreement, Pakistani nuclear weapon test clearly was not influenced by the 
conclusion of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. It was more directly influenced by two 
nuclear weapon tests of India in 1978 and 1998. The first nuclear test of India made Pakistan 
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consider the necessity of development of nuclear weapons and the second nuclear test made 
Pakistan conduct nuclear weapons test immediately. However, the determination of the 
Pakistani government to keep the developed nuclear warhead must be influenced by the US-
India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Like the DPRK case, it must be not the only factor that made 
Pakistan keeping its nuclear weapons, but it should be one of the reasons. However, 
considering the literal meaning of manufacturing nuclear weapons and keeping the 
manufactured nuclear weapons are different, this case cannot be applied to Article I of the 
NPT. Therefore, the US has not violated Article I of the NPT regarding Pakistani nuclear 
weapons development. 
The position of China regarding the entry into NSG for Pakistan and India also addresses 
interesting points. China is against India’s entry into the NSG since India is not a member 
state of the NPT although other NWS are positive about the case.
37
 This Chinese view is 
correct since China, as an NWS member of the NPT, has an obligation not to encourage other 
NNWS manufacturing nuclear weapons. However, at the same time, China is arguing that the 
criteria-based approach should be applied for the entry of the NSG which means that either 
both India and Pakistan can get into the NSG or none of them can enter the NSG.
38
 This view 
is not in accordance with the obligation as an NWS. To keep the nuclear non-proliferation 
principle, China should maintain that both India and Pakistan should enter the NPT to get into 
the NSG. Of course, the Chinese position is more logical than the US position which only 
agrees on Indian entry into NSG but does not allow Pakistan entry. The US explained this 
exceptional case like this; Nicolas Burns, the chief negotiator of the US-India Civil Nuclear 
Agreement, said “India’s trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-
the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, 
because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can’t say that about Pakistan”.39 
Trust and credibility cannot be used as legal grounds to discriminate Pakistan regarding this 
matter since it is more like political factors. 
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1.2. Interpretation of Article II of the NPT 
In Article II, the NNWS parties undertake not to: 
“(…) receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 
The definition of manufacture is the key issue to interpret the meaning of Article II of the NPT. 
Since the law does not clearly state the meaning of manufacture, it is ambiguous whether 
planning, researching or other activities constitute the breach of Article II of the NPT or not. A 
treaty should be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.40 
Joyner pointed out that the physical construction of a nuclear explosive device means the 
original meaning of manufacture in Article II of the NPT.
41
 Even if the meaning is broadly 
expanded, at least, there should be the physical construction of the component parts of a 
nuclear explosive device.
42
 Research and development activities that could be eventually 
used for manufacturing nuclear weapons might be justified under the NPT according to the 
Joyner’s argument. According to this logic, the UNSC Resolutions which were imposed on 
Iran owing to its nuclear program were not in accordance with the international law since Iran 
has never manufactured nuclear explosive devices so far.
43
 However, one of the UNSC 
resolutions which was imposed on DPRK before its first nuclear test can be regarded as the 
right one since the DPRK eventually developed nuclear weapons later.
44
 Since the UNSC 
resolution 1695 did not mention Article II of the NPT as the ground for the condemnation, the 
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resolution was not against international law. 
However, Persbo opposes against Joyner’s argument, claiming that any intended activities for 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be regarded breach of the preamble of the NPT 
since the proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase the chance of nuclear war.
45
 
According to the principles of treaty interpretation stated in the VCLT, the preamble of the 
treaty is one of the elements for the interpretation.
46
 However, since Persbo’s interpretation is 
beyond the original meanings of the term, manufacture, it is not correct. The fact that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons might increase the chance of nuclear war cannot be the 
reason to expand the meaning of manufacture to research or development. Since India, Israel 
and Pakistan have never joined the NPT, they will not be examined in this chapter but in the 
later chapter.
47
 
1.2.1. Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development 
Iran started its nuclear programme from the 1950s under the US support.
48
 The Tehran 
Research Reactor, which was fuelled by highly enriched uranium, commenced its operation in 
1967.
49
 Iran ratified the NPT in 1970.
50
 However, as the Iranian Revolution overthrew the 
US-friendly monarch of Iran in 1979, the situation has been changed. There were some 
suspicions that Iran might have an intention for developing nuclear weapons, but there was no 
clear evidence before Alireza Jafarzadeh, an Iranian dissident, publicly revealed the existence 
of two nuclear sites in 2002.
51
 One of the IAEA reports in 2003 states that “Iran has failed to 
meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear 
material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities 
where the material was stored and processed”.52 However, another IAEA report which was 
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reported in the same year stated that it is not certain whether undeclared nuclear material and 
activities which were stated from the previous report are the evidence of nuclear weapons 
programme.
53
 Another IAEA report in 2005 also just stated that Iran failed to comply with 
Article XII.C of the IAEA’s Statute.54 However, there was no mention that the nuclear 
weapons programme was founded. 
The IAEA report is the most non-biased and reliable resource to analyse the violation of the 
NPT provisions since other states’ reports are comparably more influenced by each state’s 
interests. According to the IAEA reports from 2003, Iran has never produced nuclear weapons. 
According to the abovementioned Joyner’s interpretation, limiting the meaning of 
manufacture to the physical construction of a nuclear explosive device, Iran has not violated 
Article II of the NPT.
55
 However, the violation of Article III of the NPT can be claimed since 
the IAEA report in 2005 stated that Iran breached many of its NPT safeguards agreement. 
Article III of the NPT obliges each NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards by concluding 
agreements with IAEA. As the IAEA report in 2005 stated, if Iran violates its obligations of 
the NPT Safeguards Agreement, it also constitutes the violation of Article III of the NPT. 
1.2.2. The DPRK Nuclear Weapons Development 
The DPRK joined the NPT in 1985. However, some evidence had been piled that the DPRK 
was developing nuclear weapons. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula (JDDKP) was declared in 1992 by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
which states that “[t]he South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, 
possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons”.56 However, this is not a treaty, so the JDDKP 
does not legally bind both parties. One of the reasons that both the DPRK and the ROK have 
never concluded any treaty is that both states do not recognise each other as a state. According 
to the Constitution of the ROK, one of the articles recognises the existence of the DPRK by 
stating “[t]he Republic of Korea shall seek unification” but another article of the Constitution 
denies the existence of the DPRK by stating “[t]he territory of the Republic of Korea shall 
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consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands” which means that the territory of the 
ROK includes the territory of the DPRK.
57
 
However, the IAEA reported to the UNSC that the DPRK did not report all of its nuclear 
facilities and some of those facilities might be related to the nuclear weapons programme.
58
 
The DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, but as the US concluded an 
agreement which promised arrangements for two light water reactors and normalisation of 
diplomatic relations between two states, the DPRK suspended notification of withdrawal from 
the NPT in 1994.
59
 This Agreed Framework between the two states is not a treaty as it had 
not taken any process for the legal effect. As the US Congress rejected US funding for light 
water reactors and it had not taken further steps for normalisation of relations with the DPRK, 
and the DPRK withdrew the NPT in 2003. The DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 
and conducted further nuclear tests and produced nuclear warheads. 
Although both the US and the DPRK had violated the Agreed Framework and the JDDKP, it 
is difficult to say that they violated international law since both agreements do not have legal 
binding force. However, the DPRK’s violation of safeguards agreement with the IAEA and 
the NPT should be analysed since those have legally binding force.
60
 Firstly, it is difficult to 
say that the DPRK violated Article II of the NPT since it had not produced nuclear weapons at 
least before its withdrawal from the NPT. However, as IAEA reports pointed, the DPRK 
violated the safeguards agreement for sure. 
Furthermore, as the DPRK had started to develop nuclear weapons before its withdrawal from 
the NPT by trading nuclear weapon technology and ballistic missile technology with Pakistan, 
the DPRK also had violated the preamble of the NPT.
61
 As Pakistan is not the NPT member 
state, analysation for Pakistan will be covered in the later chapter.
62
 As an NPT state, the 
DPRK should not have pursued the use of nuclear energy for the military purpose. However, 
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the DPRK violated this obligation by giving ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and 
receiving nuclear weapon technology from Pakistan. As Article I of the NPT obliges only the 
NWS not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons, the provision should not be applied to 
the DPRK. However, still, as the preamble of the NPT states that “the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war”, the DPRK had an obligation 
not to transfer ballistic missile technology which will be used as a nuclear weapons delivery. 
The legality of the DPRK withdrawal of the NPT will be examined in the later chapter 
separately.
63
 
1.3. Other Violations of International Law regarding the Iranian Nuclear Crisis 
The US has violated some international law regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis. The 
JCPOA has been concluded in 2015, and it was regarded as the end of long-lasting Iranian 
Nuclear Crisis.
64
 According to the JCPOA, Iran accepted that IAEA would have regular 
access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. Also, Iran promised to cut its stockpile of low-enriched 
uranium and the number of its gas centrifuges. However, in 2018, the US announced its 
withdrawal from the JCPOA as Iran did not meet the requirements of the treaty.
65
 The US 
demanded three things: the restriction provisions on Iranian ICBM development, greater 
access to Iranian military sites and deletion of sunset provisions, which states the automatical 
expiration of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program as time passed.66 Although there were 
many strong condemnations from other relevant states, the US brought back all sanctions 
lifted just the same as before the conclusion of the JCPOA.
67
 
Firstly, no state neither signed nor ratified the JCPOA. The JCPOA does not contain 
provisions for ratification or entry into force, but only the date when sanctions should be lifted 
is referred as the implementation day.
68
 Since the JCPOA has not gone through the necessary 
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process for the legal effect, the JCPOA is not considered as a treaty. The JCPOA is an 
unsigned document which relies on voluntary measures rather than binding obligations.
69
 
Therefore, international law would not prohibit the US President from withdrawing from the 
JCPOA and imposing sanctions on Iran. 
However, as the JCPOA has been connected with the UNSC resolution 2231, whether the 
resolution imposes legal obligations on the US or not has become a complicated issue. The 
UN Charter states that the members of the UN accept and carry out the decisions of the 
UNSC.
70
 It is clear that the UNSC intended to lift all previous sanctions from Iran, and this 
has binding effects as these paragraphs begin with the term, decide.
71
 However, whether the 
US should not impose sanctions on Iran to comply with the JCPOA is more complicated. 
Calls upon all Members States (…) to take such actions as may be appropriate to 
support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate 
with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by 
refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the 
JCPOA[.]
72
 
The meaning of the term, calls upon, is not decisive yet. There are approximately equal 
numbers of commentators who indicate that it requires mandatory action and who indicate 
that it is merely recommendatory.
73
 However, the author believes that the US has a clear 
obligation to comply with the JCPOA from this paragraph. Firstly, there was a case where the 
UK asserted that Iran had an obligation from the paragraph which starts with the term, calls 
upon. The UK maintained that Iran had an obligation to take the steps required by the IAEA 
before the 31
st
 of August 2006 deadline established by paragraph 7 of Resolution 1696 as 
paragraph 1 of the same resolution calls upon it.
74
 The UNSC resolution 1696 sanction was 
imposed on Iran and was lifted according to the UNSC resolution 2231. Therefore, to keep the 
consistency, the term, calls upon, in the UNSC resolution 2231 should be interpreted in a way 
that the US has an obligation to follow the JCPOA. 
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Furthermore, the paragraph indicates all Members States to take action. Even if the resolution 
simply recommends other states to take actions, at least the state parties to the JCPOA have 
more responsibility for the implementation plan. If the US made this agreement with other 
states and the UNSC recommends such actions according to the same agreement, and then the 
US does not follow the agreement, this cannot be logical. 
Another issue regarding the new US sanctions on Iran is the ICJ order in 2018.
75
 On October 
3, 2018, the ICJ made an order that the US, in accordance with its obligations under the 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of 
America and Iran (1955 Treaty), must lift its sanctions which were announced in May 2018 
on Iran.
76
 However, the US protested that the ICJ had no jurisdiction and announced the 
termination of the 1955 Treaty.
77
 Firstly, although the US announced its withdrawal of the 
1955 Treaty, in March 2019, the treaty is still valid and will be valid until October 2, 2019, 
one year later from the withdrawal announcement by the US according to the paragraph 3 of 
Article XXIII of the 1955 Treaty which stipulates one year’s of period of term. Ironically, 
neither of the two states has ever terminated the 1955 Treaty but kept this during over four 
decades of hostile relations since the 1979 revolution in Iran. Both states brought their 
conflicts to the ICJ and claimed the breach of the 1955 Treaty to each other and received court 
decisions which cited the 1955 Treaty.
78
 Therefore, the 1955 Treaty is still valid. 
The US also questioned the jurisdiction of the ICJ. According to the ICJ Statute, the states 
parties may at any time declare the jurisdiction of the ICJ in all legal disputes concerning the 
interpretation of a treaty.
79
 Accordingly, as a state party to ICJ Statute, Iran may bring the 
case of an alleged violation of the 1955 Treaty to ICJ any time. Although there is no method 
of enforcement, “the orders on the provisional measure under Article 41 [of the ICJ Statute] 
have binding effect” and thus create international legal obligations. 80  Therefore, the 
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arguments of the US regarding the jurisdiction of the ICJ and invalidity of the 1955 Treaty 
cannot be accepted, and the US should follow the order of the ICJ regarding the case of 
alleged violation of the 1955 Treaty by lifting the sanctions on Iran which were re-imposed 
after the withdrawal of JCPOA in 2018.
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2. DISARMAMENT UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT 
The UN General assembly Resolution laid out a series of principles, three-pillar framework: 
nuclear weapons non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear 
disarmament.
81
 The first two principles of the NPT have been discussed already in the 
previous chapter. Unlike those two principles, nuclear disarmament principle does not have 
detailed and sophisticated contents. There is a separate organisation, IAEA, with safeguards 
system which requires several steps and procedures for the NNWS to assure the principle of 
non-proliferation. The second pillar also has not been arisen as a critical issue of the NPT so 
far. The last principle, nuclear disarmament which implies that the NWS would eventually 
eliminate their nuclear arms was the key inducement which made the NNWS accept the 
temporary unequal status quo.
82
 Disarmament was considered as giving, and the non-
proliferation was considered as a return.
83
 In this chapter, whether this principle has been 
appropriately worked during the last forty-nine years will be analysed. 
Since Article VI of the NPT covers several elements, the author divided the article for 
efficient and accurate interpretation. Following is the division of Article VI: 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith (…) 
(1) (…) on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date; 
(2) (…) on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament; 
(3) (…) on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.” 
It seems like the cessation of the nuclear arms race part is the most urgent obligation 
compared to the other two parts since only the nuclear arms race part states the phrase, at an 
early date. Apart from this, the text alone does not indicate that there is a chronological order 
for these three obligations.
84
 As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, according to the 
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principles of treaty interpretation stated in the VCLT, the preamble of the treaty is one of the 
elements for the interpretation.
85
 A relevant paragraph to Article VI can be found from the 
preamble of the treaty as well. It says: 
(…) Desiring (…) to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national 
arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (…) 
This paragraph clearly shows what the ultimate aim of the NPT is. To achieve its aim stated in 
the paragraph, Article VI of the treaty states “[e]ach of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith”. The substance of the principle of good faith is the negation 
of unintended and literal interpretations of words that might result in one of the parties 
gaining an unfair or unjust advantage over another party.
86
 Although Article VI of the treaty 
states each of the Parties to the Treaty, not the NWS, as responsible parties to Article VI, 
practically, the NWS are the only responsible parties since Article II of the treaty already 
strictly bans the NNWS from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. If the prerequisite 
to be an NNWS is non-possession of nuclear weapons, logically, nuclear disarmament is not 
needed. Therefore, only the NWS will be examined whether those states have violated Article 
VI or not. Common part for all three parts will be examined first. 
“Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith.” 
Before analysing the meaning of good faith, the background of negotiations for the treaty 
should be examined first. Although the drafting history forms only a supplementary means of 
interpretation according to the VCLT, still, it is helpful to understand the positions of each of 
the Parties.
87
 The NPT negotiations took place in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee (ENDC) on the basis of a mandate from the UN Disarmament Commission.
88
 
During the negotiations, the representatives of non-aligned nations argued strongly in the 
ENDC and various committees of the UN that for a proper balance of obligations, the nuclear 
powers should take some concrete steps for the nuclear disarmament according to the 
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principles contained in UNGA Resolution 2028. However, the NWS strongly resisted the 
inclusion of a comprehensive test ban and an agreement to cease the production of ballistic 
missiles provisions in the treaty arguing that this would make the success of the NPT 
dependent on the negotiations of other treaties.
89
 Eventually, the text was watered down, and 
the references to specific measures were removed. However, clearly, representatives of non-
aligned nations back then thought of Article VI as obligations on the NWS for the exchange 
of obligations on the NNWS. Therefore, the fact that the NNWS thought Nuclear 
Disarmament as one of the exchanges for the Non-Proliferation should be considered in the 
analysis of the meaning of good faith. 
The principle of good faith in negotiations was discussed in the decision of the Arbitration 
Tribunals in the 1957 Lake Lanoux arbitration. The Arbitration Tribunal stated that an 
obligation of negotiating an agreement could be breached: 
“[I]n the event, for example, of an unjustified breaking off of the discussions, 
abnormal delay, disregard of the agreed procedures, systematic refusals to take into 
consideration adverse proposals or interests, and, more generally-, in cases of 
violation of the rules of good faith.”90 
Forty-nine years have passed since the effectuation of the NPT. According to the Arbitration 
Tribunal’s definition of abnormal delays, the NWS might have breached Article VI of the 
treaty. However, the author was not able to find any decision in international law cases 
mentioning how long periods could be regarded as abnormal delays. As auxiliary sources of 
international law, judicial decisions, including national decisions, can be used for analysation. 
Therefore, the author wants to share the Omission of Enactment case in the ROK. The 
Constitutional Court of Korea stated that Omission of Enactment for thirty-seven years could 
not be justified without legitimate reasons.
91
 The Constitutional Court of Korea saw thirty-
seven years as abnormal delays. The Legislation of Act in national law can be compared with 
the Conclusion of the Treaty in international law. Therefore, forty-nine years of delay should 
be considered critically to examine the infringement of the provision. Without grave reasons 
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for the delay, it cannot be justified, but the NWS committed a breach of the treaty. 
The obligation to negotiate was discussed in the Advisory Opinion of Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland in 1931: 
“The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engagement incumbent on the 
two Governments in conformity with the Council's Resolution is not only to enter 
into negotiation, but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to concluding 
agreements. (…) But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach 
an agreement (…).”92 
The PCIJ clearly stated that the obligation to negotiate does not include the obligation to reach 
an agreement. Therefore, with these ideas about the principle of good faith and obligation to 
reach an agreement, three parts of Article VI of the treaty will be examined in order. 
2.1. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.” 
According to the definition by Smith, the arms race is the participation of two or more states 
in apparently competitive or interactive increases in quantity or quality of war material.
93
 
Since there is no treaty which prohibits the general military researches and expansions, states 
have the right to develop and expand their arms. Therefore, increases in quantity or quality of 
military expansions and researches themselves should not be regarded as arms race 
automatically. However, it should be analysed whether it is apparently competitive or not. 
Based on this definition, most of the scholars concluded that the nuclear arms race ended with 
the break-up of the USSR.
94
 As proof of the end of the nuclear arms race, the global nuclear 
stockpiles had been dramatically decreased after the Cold War as it can be seen from chart 1.
95
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Chart 1 Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945-2018
96
 
 
However, some scholars argue that the world is entering a new nuclear arms race. Tannenwald 
and Gorbachev said the US withdrawal of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 
2002 was the start of a new arms race in the perspective of Russia.
97
 Russian President 
Vladimir Putin shows the same perspective by saying that “[t]hose who have been creating 
new arms races over the last 15 years” is the reason for Russia’s development of new nuclear 
weapons.
98
 Moreover, the US confirmed its withdrawal from the INF Treaty in February 
2019. The US gave Russia 180 days to remove their violating missiles. However, Russia 
argues that their missiles are not against the INF Treaty.
99
 If the INF Treaty has been 
terminated, the chance of new nuclear arms race will be increased. Zala stated that all the 
world’s nuclear-armed states, except for the DPRK, have begun modernising and upgrading 
their arsenals.
100
 Those who argue about a new nuclear arms race commonly pointed out that 
the new arms race is focused on qualitative development rather than quantitative increase. 
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The author thinks that nuclear arms race has never been stopped even after the cold war and a 
new nuclear arms race that other scholars have mentioned is just continuous action of the 
nuclear arms race which was started during the cold war. The nuclear arms race should be 
analysed differently from any other military arms race. A treaty should be interpreted “in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.”101 Article VI is divided into three parts, and the 
first part mentions the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the second part states about the 
nuclear disarmament. Clearly, cessation of nuclear arms race should be achieved before 
nuclear disarmament considering the phrase, at an early date, is put to the arms race part. 
Nuclear disarmament is a bigger and more comprehensive concept than the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race. Cessation of arms race is the first step for disarmament since Article VI 
stipulates the nuclear disarmament later. Considering this, any further research and 
development for military nuclear materials should be regarded as an arms race and should be 
interpreted as a breach of pursuing negotiations in good faith. Upgrading nuclear weapons and 
pursuing negotiations in good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms race cannot co-exist 
since two actions are opposite to one another. 
Clearly, the quantity of nuclear warheads of the US and Russia has been decreasing since the 
middle of the 1980s. START I, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and New START 
dramatically have reduced the number of nuclear warheads, and it can be regarded as the 
compliance of Article VI of the NPT.
102
 France and the UK had reached their maximum 
nuclear stockpiles in 1991 (540 stockpiles) and 1973 (500 stockpiles) respectively but ever 
since then, stockpiles have been decreasing gradually (300 stockpiles and 215 stockpiles 
respectively in 2018). However, the last NWS, China has been increasing its nuclear 
stockpiles until now (280 stockpiles in 2018), though the amount of increase is not as 
dramatic as the US and the USSR during the Cold War period.
103
 Expansion of nuclear 
stockpiles by China until now is a clear violation of Article VI of the NPT which requires all 
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treaty members to pursue negotiations in good faith to cease the nuclear arms race. 
Increases in the quantity of war material are not the only criterion to judge whether it is arms 
race or not. Increases in the quality of nuclear weapons should be analysed as well. In 2013, at 
the Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Indonesian 
representative, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), elaborated clearly 
that the NAM regards further invest in modernising or upgrading nuclear weapons as a breach 
of Article VI: 
“In order to comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty, as well as 
with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Action Plan on nuclear 
disarmament, the NWS must immediately cease their plans to further invest in 
modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing, or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons 
and related facilities.”104 
Although Yusup argued that refurbishing or extending the lives of nuclear weapons should be 
ceased immediately, they are not against the first part of Article VI, the nuclear arms race part. 
It just maintains the current nuclear arsenals to keep the current capacity of nuclear weapons. 
However, modernising or upgrading nuclear weapons, they can be regarded as a continuation 
of race arms. It depends on the actual meaning of modernising and upgrading. The US 
government has planned to spend up to $1,082 trillion in total for the renovation of the 
nuclear arsenals for thirty years.
105
 As a part of the renovation, nuclear warhead life extension 
programmes (LEP) have been started. These are projects to upgrade or replace critical 
elements of existing nuclear weapons to either improve safety or ensure the operation of these 
systems beyond their currently planned life expectancies.
106
 As the CTBT bans all nuclear 
explosion, nuclear warhead LEP are not avoidable to maintain the current number of nuclear 
capacity. Therefore, the LEP should not be regarded as a part of the arms race automatically 
as long as this programme does not enhance the ability more than before. 
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2.1.1. Nuclear Weapons Deliveries 
Nuclear weapons deliveries also should be examined to check whether the arms race had been 
ceased. Land-launched nuclear missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and nuclear 
bombs or missiles launched by bomber aircraft are nuclear weapons delivery. Since nuclear 
weapons cannot be used without delivery tools, development and upgrading of delivery 
technology are directed to the nuclear military upper hand. Therefore, developing new nuclear 
weapons deliveries might constitute the violation of Article VI of the treaty. Also, the 
Preamble of the NPT proclaims the elimination of means of nuclear weapons delivery. The 
Preamble also can be the legal ground of the prohibition of development of the means of 
nuclear weapons delivery. To examine whether states still have not finished the arms race or 
not, the thesis will analyse only the developments of technology which were conducted during 
the 21
st
 century since the new century is clearly free from the Cold War period. Three kinds of 
means of nuclear weapons deliveries were examined: land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and air-based nuclear 
weapons (air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs). Unfortunately, it seems like all 
NWS are still developing and upgrading means of nuclear weapons delivery which might 
constitute a breach of international law. 
Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) of each NWS will be examined first. 
The US ICBMs completed a multibillion-dollar, decade-long modernisation programme in 
2015 to extend the service life of the Minuteman III to 2030.
107
 Although the US did not 
deploy a new ICBM, numbers of missiles have been refurbished. The refurbishing includes 
the flight controls, “the propellant in all three stages, the guidance system and the Propulsion 
System Rocket Engine” according to the Air Force personnel.108 In 2017, the Air Force 
concluded contracts to develop the next-generation ICBM.
109
 The new missile is expected to 
have a longer range than the previous one, making it possible to target from the continental 
US to China, Iran and the DPRK.
110
 The LEP for Minuteman III and the conclusion of 
contracts for new-generation ICBM constitute the violation of the preamble of the treaty since 
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the improvement of nuclear abilities cannot be justified under the purpose of the treaty. Also, 
those actions constitute a breach of Article VI of the treaty because pursuing negotiations in 
good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms race cannot co-exist with the development of 
nuclear arsenals. 
In the Russian case, Russia is on the progress to replace all Soviet period missiles to the new 
ones by the early 2020s through a modernisation programme.
111
 However, due to the lack of 
reliable sources, it is difficult to find out what is improved in newer types of missiles 
compared to the old Soviet versions, but the Kristensen and Norris surmised that new missiles 
had been upgraded remarkably.
112
 Russia tested a new nuclear missile, RS-28, Sarmat missile 
in 2018 and the Russian military announced its success.
113
 New hypersonic ICBM seems to 
be able to carry more nuclear warheads with a longer range.
114
 If new Russian ICBM has 
been upgraded as it is estimated, it is a breach of the preamble and Article VI of the treaty by 
the same token with the US case. 
The UK and France have not developed land-based ICBM. France decommissioned its 
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 1996. Chinese land-based ICBM modernisation is 
“part of a transition from older, transportable, liquid-fuel, slow-launching missiles to longer-
range, road-mobile, solid-fuel, quicker-launching missiles”. The DF-31 has a range of more 
than 7,000 km, but cannot reach the continental United States. However, DF-31A, a new 
extended-range version of the DF-31 which was developed in 2007, is designed to reach 
targets in most of the continental United States. Therefore, China also have violated the 
preamble and Article VI of the treaty by developing ICBM technologies.
115
 
Now, the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) of each NWS will be examined. The 
US is developing the Columbia-class submarine to replace the current Ohio-class nuclear 
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in the late 2020s.
116
 However, SLBM itself has 
not been developed further since 1987 in the US. The UGM-133A Trident II or the Trident D5 
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is an SLBM which was first deployed in 1990 for the US Navy. In 2017, the US Navy started 
to deploy the upgraded Trident II D5LE as a part of LEP. D5LE will also arm the new US 
Columbia-class submarines when they enter service.
117
 This LEP is not a mere assurance of 
the reliability or safety but enhancement of nuclear military capabilities. The 100-kt Trident II 
warhead has three times bigger destructive power compared to the previous one.
118
 The US 
Navy violated the cessation of the nuclear arms race part of Article VI of the NPT by 
upgrading Trident II D5LE since it increases the killing power of the nuclear force 
tremendously and it cannot co-exist with Article VI. 
In the Russian case, the Russian Navy operates three kinds of SSBN at the moment. The 
Borei class is the newest model among them, and the improved Borei-A SSBNs are under 
construction.
119
 Russia operates three kinds of SLBM, and two of them, RSM-54 and RSM-
50 were newly developed during the 21
st
 century whereas RSM-50 was deployed in 1978.
120
 
Due to the lack of available information about Russian SLBMs, it is difficult to analyse how 
much the Russian Navy improved its current SLBMs compare to previous old SLBMs. If the 
Russian Army has developed its SLBMs ability just like other NWS, it constitutes the breach 
of arms race part of Article VI of the NPT. 
In the UK case, the Royal Navy is developing Dreadnought-class submarine to replace the 
current Vanguard class of SSBN.
121
 However, the UK has not developed SLBM 
independently. There was a treaty that the US agreed to provide the UK to purchase Polaris 
missiles in 1963.
122
 The NPT has entered into force in 1970, which was seven years later 
from the entering into force of the Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA). Therefore, the first launch 
of the Polaris missile of the British vessel in 1968
123
 and other activities date before the NPT 
entering into force, 5
th
 of March 1970, should not be regulated by the NPT provisions. 
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However, activities of the US and the UK after the effectuation of the NPT should follow the 
purpose and provisions of the NPT. According to Article 30 paragraph 3 of VCLT, “when all 
parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty (…), the earlier treaty applies 
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty”. In this case, 
the US and the UK are all parties to the earlier treaty, the PSA, and at the same time, parties to 
the latter treaty, the NPT. So, Article 30(3) of VCLT should be applied. Most of the provisions 
of PSA are against the purpose of the NPT, especially Article VI of the NPT since the PSA 
covers the exchange of nuclear weapons deliveries technology to enhance the ability of 
nuclear weapons. Clearly, missiles are not nuclear weapons, and Article I of the NPT only 
prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
124
 Therefore, 
Both states have not violated Article I of the NPT.
125
 
However, as Article VI gives each of the Parties to the Treaty an obligation to enter 
negotiations for nuclear disarmament, the NWS have a responsibility to pursue negotiations to 
each other. Nevertheless, the US and the UK had a negotiation which is actually against their 
responsibility deriving from the NPT and even reached an agreement to enhance their nuclear 
capabilities jointly. Each action by states is not a separate independent action. They all should 
be analysed and judged with other state actions. The exchange of nuclear missiles to enhance 
the nuclear capabilities by the government cannot co-exist with pursuing negotiations in good 
faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. 
Moreover, the US and the UK amended the PSA in 1982 to make the UK be able to buy 
Trident II missiles.
126
 As the UK decommissioned its tactical WE177 bombs which were 
equipped by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for the UK in 1998, the Trident II has 
been the only operational nuclear weapons system in the UK service.
127
 This case is even 
more serious breach of international law since the amendment had been concluded after the 
NPT entered into the force. The amendment of the agreement in 1982 after the NPT 
agreement cannot be justified and thus constitutes the breach of international law. The UK is 
still continuously violating the law by using the Trident II and the making a decision to 
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participate in the US life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile.
128
 As it was 
mentioned above in the US SLBM part, the primary purpose of LEP for Trident D5 is to 
increase nuclear abilities. The purchase of Trident missile from the US by the UK also has the 
same purpose of increasing the nuclear abilities of the UK. Moreover, the UK should be 
criticised more for the violation of Article VI of the NPT since it had pursued negotiations for 
the enhancement of nuclear abilities, and actually had concluded the agreements instead of 
pursuing the negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The US also is not 
innocent in this case since it also had pursued negotiations which resulted in the development 
of nuclear abilities of other state and actually had concluded the agreements. 
In conclusion, the conclusion of the PSA in 1963 and actions of nuclear weapons 
development or exchange of related technologies which had conducted date before the NPT 
entering into force are not against international law. However, state actions which have been 
implemented date after the NPT entering into force should follow the purpose of the NPT, but 
the UK has violated the Article VI and preamble of the NPT by concluding the amendment of 
the agreement in 1982 which made the UK be able to purchase Trident II missiles. Moreover, 
the decision to participate in the US life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile by 
the UK government also will constitute the breach of Article VI and preamble of the NPT if it 
actually happens in the near future. 
The French Navy operates Triomphant-class SSBNs since 1997.
129
 Given that the 
Triomphant-class SSBNs are expected to reach the end of their operational lives in the 2030s, 
development on a new generation of SSBN is expected to begin soon.
130
 The new submarine 
class, which is known as SNLE-3G, incorporates a longer hull and advanced stealth 
features.
131
 All French SSBNs carry the M51 SLBM, which was deployed starting in 2010 to 
replace the M45 SLBM.
132
 The M51.1 has a longer operational range and better accuracy 
than the M45, and the M51.2, an upgraded version of the M51.1 carries a new warhead, the 
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tête nucléaire océanique (TNO), while M51.1 carries TN75, the warhead of the previous 
version. The TNO is stealthier than the TN75, has an increased yield of 150 kilotons, and is 
housed within a new re-entry vehicle, with the entire package weighing approximately 500 
kilograms. This new M51.2 will be carried by all French Navy SSBNs by 2020. A new 
upgraded version, M51.3 which has extended range and further improvement in accuracy is in 
development.
133
 Developing of the M51 SLBM and upgrading of M51.1 and M51.2 
constitute a violation of Article VI and the preamble of the NPT which states pursuing 
negotiations in good faith to stop the nuclear arms race. Also, if the French government 
develops a new generation of SSBN or upgrades M51.2 to M51.3 as it planned, those actions 
also should be regarded as a violation of the same law as those developments and upgrades 
lead the remarkable improvement of French nuclear capability. Ironically, since France is the 
most transparent one in its information about nuclear capacity among the nuclear-armed states, 
it is easier to analyse its breach of international law.
134
 
China is operating a fleet of four Jin-class SSBNs.
135
 First Jin-class SSBN was operational in 
2007. Owing to the lack of official data about SSBN of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLA Navy), it is difficult to compare the specifications of Jin-class SSBN and Xia-
class SSBN, a former SSBN model of PLA Navy. However, compared to the other states’ 
SSBN models, PLA Navy SSBN model performs poorly along with a noise problem.
136
 The 
current Chinese SLBM, JL-2 is a second generation model which has been deployed since 
2015. JL-2 has a more extended range of more than 7,000 km than previous SLBM model, 
JL-1. The PLA Navy also conducted the first JL-3 SLBM test in the Bohai sea in November 
2018.
137
 JL-3 is presumed to have more than 9,000 km of range.
138
 Due to the lack of official 
data about SSBN, it is difficult to know whether China qualitatively upgraded its SSBN in the 
21
st
 century. However, if China also has upgraded its new Jin-class SSBN compared to the 
previous Xia-class SSBN, it constitutes the breach of Article VI and the preamble of the NPT. 
Moreover, considering the fact that JL-2 is functionally much more developed than JL-1, this 
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also constitutes the violation of the same law and current development of JL-3 with even 
longer range than JL-2 also should be regarded in the same way. 
Air-based nuclear weapons will be examined from this part. The US has deployed nuclear 
gravity bombs on B-2, and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) on B-52. B61-7, 
B61-11, and B83-1 are used as gravity bombs, and AGM-86B is used as nuclear ALCM. The 
US is modernising its nuclear bomber force by upgrading nuclear gravity bombs. The first 
guided, standoff nuclear gravity bomb will replace all current gravity bombs in the mid-2020s. 
AGM-86B also will be replaced by new long-range standoff missile in 2030. The new missile 
will have longer range, greater accuracy, and enhanced stealth. These technological 
advancements of nuclear gravity bombs and nuclear ALCMs are against Article VI and the 
preamble of the NPT.
139
 
Russia operates Tu-160 and Tu-95MS. Both can carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent ALCM and 
gravity bombs. The upgrading for some of both aircraft had been done by 2016 already, and 
the rest of the aircraft also will be modernised by 2019. Russia is also planning a new version 
of the Tu-160, known as Tu-160M2, which is scheduled to begin production around 2024. 
These developments are also cases of breach of Article VI and preamble of the NPT.
140
 
The UK has not possessed any air-based nuclear weapons so far. France has both Naval and 
Air Forces for nuclear missions. The strategic air forces operate Rafale BF3 aircraft, and the 
Naval Nuclear Aviation Force operates Rafale MF3 aircraft which is operated with France’s 
sole aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle. The French minister of the Armed Forces 
announced that in 2020, France would make a decision on replacing Charles de Gaulle. Also, 
France has begun design development of a stealthier, extended-range replacement for the 
current missile, ASMPA, which will be called the ASN4G and enter into service around 2035. 
As France has not started its production yet, it might be early to analyse that it breaches 
Article VI and preamble of the NPT, but if France implements its plan as it is scheduled, a 
clear violation of the law will happen soon.
141
 
Although Chinese H-6 bombers are able to carry out nuclear missions, it is believed that the 
PLA Air Force does not currently have a nuclear mission according to the 2017 report by the 
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US defence department. However, Chinese officials announced its development of a new 
long-range bomber in 2016 and the US officials expect this will have a nuclear mission. The 
new bomber might become operational by the mid- or late-2020s. If China is developing a 
bomber for nuclear mission purpose, China is against Article VI and preamble of the NPT.
142
 
The conclusion of analyses of nuclear weapons deliveries is that all NWS are modernising 
and upgrading their nuclear weapons deliveries and it is against the first part of Article VI of 
the NPT which states the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. 
2.1.2. Nuclear Missiles Defence System 
Mutually assured destruction is the main theory which has a strong influence in the nuclear 
weapons world. This theory claims that conflicts between states can be prevented by mutual 
vulnerability on the nuclear attack. According to the theory, if one of the NWS, A, is able to 
survive after the first nuclear attack from another NWS, B, and A can retaliate against B with 
nuclear weapons, B will never use nuclear weapons. A also will not use nuclear weapons if 
the same situation is expected. For this, both states should know that each other’s nuclear 
attack can leave unavoidable harm to each other. For this, vulnerability on the nuclear attack 
is necessary. 
The ABM Treaty was concluded based on this theory in 1972 by the US and the USSR. 
However, the US withdrew from the treaty according to the Article XV of the ABM Treaty in 
2002. The US explained that as both the US and Russia face new threats of mass destruction 
by terrorists and rogue states, the missile defence system is needed.
143
 As a response, in 2002, 
Russia withdrew from Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) which limited the 
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) on ICBMs.
144
 During a speech to 
the Russian Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin maintained that Russia started to 
develop its new nuclear weapons since the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
145
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Firstly, both the US and Russia withdrew the treaty in accordance with the provisions of each 
treaty. However, the withdrawal of the ABM Treaty by the US is often regarded as the start of 
a new nuclear arms race as it spurred other NWS to develop the nuclear capabilities in various 
ways. In this perspective, the withdrawal of the ABM Treaty should be regarded as a clear 
breach of the first part of Article VI of the NPT which mentions the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race. Because, even if the nuclear arms race had ended right after the end of the cold war, 
if the NWS have entered another new nuclear arms race, this situation cannot be interpreted as 
an observance of the Article VI and preamble of the NPT. Although the US had fired this new 
nuclear arms race, Russia’s reaction cannot be justified since it is still a member state of the 
NPT. Russia should not have withdrawn from START II but should have entered negotiations 
and talk to deal with a problem. However, Russia eventually justifies its development of new 
nuclear weapons with an excuse of ABM Treaty withdrawal which had happened seventeen 
years ago. Russia’s action also should be criticised for the violation of Article VI and 
preamble of the NPT. 
2.1.3. Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaties 
Nuclear weapon ban treaties should be examined to check the observance of Article VI of the 
NPT by nuclear powers. There are two kinds of nuclear weapon ban treaties: ban on the use of 
nuclear weapons in certain areas and ban on nuclear weapons by prohibiting means of a 
nuclear test. 
The ban on the use of nuclear weapons in certain areas will be examined first. Although the 
primary purpose of the Antarctic treaty is a prohibition of any military activity in the Antarctic, 
as the treaty clearly prohibits any nuclear explosions in the Antarctic and the disposal thereof 
radioactive waste material, the treaty can be regarded as a first nuclear test ban treaty.
146
 All 
NWS and non-NPT nuclear powers except Israel have ratified this treaty. The main purpose of 
the Outer Space Treaty is to ban placing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) in the outer space and limits the use of celestial bodies to peaceful purposes.
147
 All 
NWS and non-NPT nuclear powers have ratified this treaty. The main purpose of the seabed 
arms control treaty is banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons or WMD on the ocean 
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floor.
148
 France, the DPRK, Israel and Pakistan have not ratified the treaty. 
Whether non-NPT nuclear powers have the obligations for the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament will be analysed in the next chapter.
149
 However, even if non-
NPT nuclear powers have obligations for the nuclear disarmament, still, it is difficult to say 
that Israel should join the Antarctic treaty since the main purpose of the treaty is not on the 
restriction of a nuclear weapon. However, for the seabed arms control treaty, since the main 
purpose of the treaty is related to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, France, as 
an NWS, should join the treaty. As France has not joined to the seabed arms control treaty 
until now, it constitutes the breach of Article VI of the NPT. 
The ban on nuclear weapons by prohibiting means of the nuclear test will be examined. 
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) is the first nuclear test ban treaty.
150
 The interesting 
point is that the PTBT bestows special status, Original Parties, to only three states out of five 
NWS, the US, the USSR and the UK. According to Article II of PTBT, the amendment 
requires the majority of the votes of member parties and the votes of all of the Original Parties. 
The reason for the exclusion of France and China from special status is that China had not 
developed its nuclear weapons yet in 1963 when the treaty was signed, and France also had 
not developed its nuclear weapons yet during the negotiation period for the PTBT in the 
1950s. As a result, China and France conducted 22 and 50 atmospheric tests respectively in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The last atmospheric test of France was in 1974, and China’s was in 
1980. China and France still have not joined the PTBT. 
Although the following CTBT superseded the PTBT, both China and France should join the 
PTBT to comply with Article VI of the NPT since the CTBT have not entered into force yet. 
China and France already have the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of CTBT as 
China signed the CTBT and France ratified the CTBT.
151
 However, to strengthen their 
obligations not to conduct nuclear tests in accordance of the obligations under Article VI of 
the NPT, they should join the PTBT especially as the circumstance that CTBT will enter into 
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force is less likely to happen any time soon. 
The CTBT prohibits any nuclear explosion at any place.
152
 The CTBT requires ratification by 
44 states which possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors during the CTBT’s 
negotiation period.
153
 However, two NWS, China, and the US have signed but not ratified the 
CTBT yet. Israel is the only non-NPT nuclear power which has signed the CTBT but others, 
the DPRK, India, and Pakistan are non-signatory states. China and the US should ratify the 
CTBT as soon as possible to comply with Article VI of the NPT. 
To sum up the chapter 2.1., China has increased its nuclear stockpiles until 2018. All NWS are 
developing, modernising and upgrading their nuclear weapons deliveries in various ways until 
now. The US withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Russia withdrew from START II and is 
developing new nuclear weapons as a response. France has not joined to the seabed arms 
control treaty. China and France have not signed the PTBT, and China and the US have not 
ratified the CTBT yet. Those are the clear evidence that the nuclear arms race exists and it is 
the violation of the first part of Article VI of the NPT which urged the NWS to cease the 
nuclear arms race at an early date. 
Although the PCIJ stated that the obligation to negotiate does not include the obligation to 
reach an agreement, considering the fact that the first part of Article VI of the NPT explicitly 
says the phrase, at an early date, too long time has been passed.
154
 The NPT entered into 
force in 1970, and forty-nine years has been passed. Forty-nine years is an abnormal delay 
which was explained in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration. Even if the nuclear war had been ended 
right after the end of the Cold War, if the new arms race has been started later, it constitutes 
the violation of Article VI of the NPT automatically. 
2.2. Nuclear Disarmament and Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to (…) nuclear disarmament.” 
Most of the scholars do not see the current situation as a continuation of the arms race.
155
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However, most of the scholars are not satisfied with the achievements regarding the nuclear 
disarmament so far, and it concludes that the NWS has not complied with Article VI of the 
NPT. Joyner argues that nuclear disarmament is distinguished from general and complete 
disarmament. The nuclear disarmament clause does not mention specific means for nuclear 
disarmament. Even the treaty is not mentioned as a means to achieve nuclear disarmament. 
This means that other means can be done to achieve the purpose. Article VI grants relatively 
broader flexibility to determine how to meet this obligation including through unilateral 
disarmament. The purpose of the NPT is nuclear disarmament, but not negotiation itself.
156
 
Therefore, the NWS should implement nuclear disarmament by themselves even if other 
NWS do not pursue negotiations in good faith. Nonfulfillment of other NWS obligations 
cannot be an excuse for not implementing nuclear disarmament since other most of the 
NNWS are following the NPT. Even if the nuclear arms race had been ended already and the 
new nuclear arms race has never begun, the analyses from chapter 2.1 can be used as evidence 
of a violation of nuclear disarmament part of Article VI of the NPT. 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith (…) on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 
A treaty is needed for general and complete disarmament. The difference between the Nuclear 
disarmament and general and complete disarmament is the level of disarmament. The latter 
has the meaning of total elimination of nuclear weapons while the former means a lower level 
of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, it can be achieved after the settlement of the first and the 
second part of Article VI of the NPT and member states could have expected the conclusion 
of general and complete disarmament will take quite a lot of time, even longer than fifty years. 
Therefore, although the NWS have not even reached this level to deal with this part, since the 
general and complete disarmament is expected to take much time, the NWS have not violated 
the last part of Article VI of the NPT.
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3. OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
For the suggestion of the new contents of the new NPT regime, other international law 
regarding nuclear weapons should be examined. The illegality of the use of nuclear weapons 
and the impossibility of co-existence of use of nuclear weapons and conformity of 
international law will be examined. New contents for the new NPT regime will be suggested 
based on the analyses presented in this chapter. Also, as non-NPT nuclear powers have 
developed nuclear weapons outside of the NPT regime, the legality of nuclear weapons of 
non-NPT nuclear powers also will be examined under the other international law regarding 
nuclear weapons. 
3.1. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons under International Law 
The main source to analyse the legality of the use of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion as it is the only international court’s opinion on nuclear weapons. The use 
of nuclear weapons under the international humanitarian law and international environmental 
law will be examined to check whether it is possible to use nuclear weapons in accordance 
with those laws. 
3.1.1. ICJ Advisory Opinion 
Although ICJ advisory opinion does not bind states legally and is treated as a secondary 
source in international law, the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion gives many legal points 
for the discussion of the legality of nuclear weapons. The ICJ put answers unanimously like 
this: 
“A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons (…) that fails to meet all 
requirements of Article 51 [of the UN Charter], is unlawful; [a] threat or use of 
nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international 
law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and 
other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons[.]”157 
These unanimous messages from the ICJ sound like it admits a threat or use of nuclear 
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weapons as a right which can be used by states as far as it follows the relevant international 
law. However, a number of judges of the ICJ do not think in this way considering other parts 
of the advisory opinions and each judge’s individual opinions on this matter. As ICJ advisory 
opinion itself only has an advisory effect, distortion of legal effect does not have to be 
concerned. Interpreting each judge’s individual opinions will only help us to understand 
advisory opinion more correctly. 
“There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive 
and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such[.]”158 
Three judges, Shahabuddeen, Koroma, and Weeramantry, voted against this statement. Judge 
Shahabuddeen argued that the absence of the comprehensive and universal prohibition of the 
use of nuclear weapons does not justify the use of nuclear weapons automatically.
159
 Both 
Judge Koroma and Weeramantry specifically pointed the Geneva Gas Protocol and Article 
23(a) of the Hague Regulations are some examples of conventional international law which 
prohibits the use of nuclear weapons.
160
 Because of the nature of the nuclear weapon that it 
widely influences the environment negatively, the use of nuclear weapons cannot comply with 
those international laws. 
The most controversial part of the advisory opinion with a vote of seven in favour and seven 
against and with the casting vote of the President is this: 
“[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake[.]”161 
Falk argued that it represented new doctrinal terrain by introducing the new concept of 
extreme circumstances of self-defence.
162
 However, introducing of this new concept of 
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extreme circumstances of self-defence is the evidence that a number of judges actually are not 
sure if there is a single case that nuclear weapons are used with the compliance of relevant 
international law. That is why judges have thought about the extreme circumstances of self-
defence to imagine if it is possible to think about the lawful case of use of nuclear weapons. 
The conclusion is that the court cannot clearly imagine the lawful case of use of nuclear 
weapons 
Three judges who voted against paragraph 105(2)B of the nuclear weapons advisory opinion 
voted against paragraph 105(2)E as well. Judge Shahabuddeen criticised that this decision 
holds the idea that humanitarian law does not apply to the use of nuclear weapons in the 
extreme circumstance of the very survival of the state.
163
 Judge Koroma said the 
unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons should be examined under the unique and 
established characteristics of those weapons but not based on the circumstance of use.
164
 
Weeramantry also argued that once nuclear weapons are used, the jus in bello should be 
applied and under the principles of the laws of war, the use of nuclear weapons are totally 
forbidden.
165
 
Although other four judges, President Bedjaoui and Judges Ferrari Bravo, Herczegh and 
Ranjeva voted in favour for paragraph 105(2)E, they expressed similar opinions from separate 
opinions with abovementioned three judges. Bedjaoui argued that since the nuclear weapons 
and humanitarian law are mutually exclusive, the existence of the one automatically means 
the non-existence of the other.
166
 Ferrari Bravo said that according to the majority of rules of 
international law, the use of nuclear weapons becomes automatically unlawful.
167
 Judge 
Herczegh argued that the use of nuclear weapons is categorically and unequivocally 
prohibited.
168
 Judge Ranjeva wrote that because of the catalytic effect of nuclear weapons, it 
should be regarded as unlawful.
169
 At least seven out of fourteen judges actually think the use 
of nuclear weapons cannot comply with international law. 
Three judges, Guillaume, Higgins and Schwebel just emphasised again that the use of nuclear 
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weapons should comply with international law.
170
 Two judges, Oda and Shi, have not 
expressed any opinion in this matter.
171
 
Only two judges, Fleischhauer and Vereshchetin, supported the interpretation that recourse to 
nuclear weapons could be lawful even if it violated international humanitarian law.
172
 
“The principles and rules of the humanitarian law and the other principles of law 
applicable in armed conflict, such as (…) the inherent right of self-defence on the 
other, which are through the very existence of the nuclear weapon in sharp opposition 
to each other, are al1 principles and rules of law. None of these principles and rules is 
above the law, they are of equal rank in law and they can be altered by law.”173 
However, as Warner argued, Fleischhauer’s interpretation confused the classical legal 
distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello by linking the application of jus in bello 
with the reasons for going to war.
174
 The right of self-defence is jus ad bellum field. 
Therefore, a state has the right to enter the war as a self-defence. However, determination for 
the means of war is jus in bello field, and the humanitarian law covers this field. Fleischhauer 
mixed up these fields. Also, even if the humanitarian law forbids the use of nuclear weapons 
in the extreme circumstance of self-defence, it does not mean that inherent right of self-
defence is denied. Requiring exercise of self-defence in accordance with the humanitarian law 
cannot be regarded as a denial of the right of self-defence. 
The nuclear weapons advisory opinion concluded that it could not answer whether the use of 
nuclear weapons would be lawful or not. However, considering the analyses of individual 
opinions of Judges, seven judges out of fourteen think the use of nuclear weapons cannot go 
together with international law. Therefore, the ICJ nuclear weapons advisory opinion should 
not be interpreted that there might be a case that nuclear weapons are used in accordance with 
international law. 
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3.1.2. Use of Nuclear Weapons under the International Humanitarian Law 
1977 Additional Protocol I stipulates that “[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to 
the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited”, and this is regarded as 
customary international law.
175
 To examine whether nuclear weapons can be applied in armed 
conflicts in accordance with the humanitarian law, the fundamental principles of international 
humanitarian law should be analysed. Fundamental principles of international humanitarian 
law are the principle of military necessity, the principle of proportionality, the principle of 
humanity and the principle of distinction.
176
 As the first three principles are linked mutually, 
those three principles were analysed together. 
The principle of distinction means the distinction between military objectives and civilian 
objects. Parties to a conflict must direct attacks only against lawful military objectives.
177
 
Any weapon that is incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets is 
unlawful. Regarding the acceptable range of error in a military operation, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) decision on the Operation Storm case 
was controversial.
178
 The original trial judgment had concluded that the Croatian army 
attacks on the towns were unlawful, in part on the basis that many shells fell more than 200 
metres away from any lawful military objective.
179
 However, the Appeals Chamber 
unanimously agreed that the Trial Chamber had not sufficiently explained the basis on which 
it arrived at a 200-metre margin of error as a reasonable measure of an indiscriminate 
attack.
180
 The judgment even asserted that the fact that a relatively large number of shells fell 
more than 200 metres from fixed artillery targets could be consistent with a much broader 
range of error.
181
 One of the judges, Fausto Pocar, criticised this that the majority also failed 
to articulate which legal principles should have applied for the acceptance range of error.
182
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As the ICTY had changed its standard on the range of error, it is difficult to examine precisely 
how much of the range of error is acceptable in international law. However, considering the 
fact that B-83 (1.2 Mt), current largest bomb in the US, makes most residential buildings 
collapse within 7.47km radius, and B-61 Mod 3 (300t), current lowest yield in US arsenal, 
creates the same effects within 310m radius, the ICTY’s 200 metre dispute shows that nuclear 
weapons are far beyond the range of error already.
183
 However the nuclear weapons aim 
targets accurately, because of their nature of large influence range, the principle of distinction 
cannot be obeyed automatically. 
The principle of military necessity, proportionality and humanity part will be examined 
together from now on. The principle of military necessity allows military means which are 
necessary to achieve a legitimate military purpose, but the principle of proportionality 
prohibits incidental damage to civilian and civilian objects which are excessive compared to 
the expected military advantage.
184
 The principle of humanity prohibits unnecessary suffering 
for the achievement of legitimate military purposes.
185
 
The term unnecessary suffering implies that some amount of suffering is necessary. To 
determine whether the suffering cause by a particular weapon is necessary, different 
alternative weapons should be compared.
186
 If there are other means and methods of warfare 
which can achieve the same legitimate military purposes with less damage to civilian and 
civilian objects, use of means and methods of warfare with more damage to civilian and 
civilian objects automatically constitutes the violation of the prohibition of unnecessary 
suffering. Considering the fact that there is no huge (more than 310 metres radius, the current 
lowest yield in US arsenal) military objective which can only be destroyed by the nuclear 
weapons, any military necessity can be satisfied with other conventional alternative weapons 
with less suffering. Therefore, the use of nuclear weapons cannot co-exist with the prohibition 
of unnecessary suffering; this directs that nuclear weapons cannot be used under the 
international humanitarian law in any circumstances. 
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3.1.3. Use of Nuclear Weapons under the International Environmental Law 
Use of nuclear weapons should be examined under the international environmental law as 
well. Article 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I prohibits the use of means of warfare 
which is expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment. Article 55 of the same Protocol says the means of warfare should be used 
carefully not to prejudice the health or survival of people. However, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s introduction part of the Draft Protocols stated that it 
did not intend to discuss problems relating to atomic warfare.
187
 However, Koppe argued that 
considering a general characteristic of the text and the fact that it does not refer to any specific 
weapon, it should be applied to any type of weapon.
188
 Since the nuclear weapon is just one 
of the means of warfare, nuclear weapons also should be applied to the Protocols despite the 
ICRC’s commentary. Article 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I will be violated if 
the nuclear weapons are used since “[a]ny types of nuclear weapons will make both blast and 
heat which cause significant damage on the ground in case of an air burst, a surface burst or a 
shallow underground burst, and radioactive contamination resulting from the explosion could 
cover large areas and last for a significant period of time”.189 
3.2. Non-NPT Nuclear Powers Cases 
Non-NPT nuclear powers, the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan have developed nuclear 
weapons outside of the NPT regime. Since a treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third state without its consent unless it is customary law, the NPT cannot oblige non-
member states any obligations.
190
 Therefore, non-NPT member states have the right to 
manufacture nuclear weapons for their own states and to transfer nuclear weapons to other 
recipients. Also, non-NPT member states do not have an obligation for nuclear disarmament. 
Therefore, the developments of nuclear weapons by India, Israel and Pakistan are not against 
international law as there is no international law which prohibits them not to manufacture 
nuclear weapons. Also, the trade of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles between the 
                                           
187
 ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: Commentary, 1973, p. 2. 
188
 E. V. Koppe. Use of nuclear weapons and protection of the environment during international armed conflict. - 
G. Nystuen et al. Nuclear Weapons Under International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 
254. 
189
 Ibid, p. 257. 
190
 VCLT. op. cit., Art 34 and Art 38. 
49 
 
DPRK and Pakistan during the period that the DPRK was the member states of the NPT is not 
against international law at least for Pakistani position since Pakistan does not have an 
obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states.
191
 
However, unlike other non-NPT nuclear powers, the DPRK should be analysed separately 
since the DPRK is the only state which withdrew from the NPT and conducted nuclear tests 
after that. The illegality of the trade between the DPRK and Pakistan was explained in the 
previous chapter.
192
 The NPT has a withdrawal provision, and it says if the party decides that 
extraordinary events have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country, the party can 
withdraw from the treaty.
193
 It requires a notice to the UNSC three months in advance with 
the statement of the extraordinary events which jeopardise its supreme interests.
194
 The 
DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 with the statement of criticism for 
unjust IAEA inspections based on the US manipulated data and the constant US nuclear 
threat.
195
 No unlawfulness was founded regarding the withdrawal issue. 
However, Coppen argues that assistance that the DPRK has received as an NPT member state 
should refrain from the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and such assistance should either be 
returned or neutralised.
196
 When the DPRK received nuclear material as an NPT member 
state from other NPT member states, as a return, the DPRK was obliged to follow Articles II 
and III of the NPT. Therefore, even if the DPRK does not have an obligation not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons as it withdrew from the NPT, it does not mean that assistance 
that it has gotten before the withdrawal can be used for military purposes. Withdrawal “does 
not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution 
of the treaty prior to its termination”.197 Therefore, the DPRK development of nuclear 
weapons after the withdrawal should be examined whether it has developed nuclear weapons 
without the help of previous assistance from the NPT member states. Considering the fact that 
the DPRK had received the nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan when the DPRK was 
the member state of the NPT, previous assistance from the NPT member states probably was 
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used for the military purpose before and after the withdrawal. Therefore, although the 
withdrawal of the NPT itself is not against international law, the DPRK has violated 
international law by using its previous conditional rights for prohibited military purpose.
51 
 
4. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NEW NPT REGIME 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was signed in 2017.
198
 It is the 
first treaty which comprehensively prohibits the development, testing, production, stockpiling, 
stationing, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.
199
 This treaty seems equal as it 
does not have a two-tier system unlike the NPT, and looks safer than the NPT as it totally 
prohibits nuclear weapons from the world. However, it seems like it cannot be a successful 
treaty as it does not consider the current international politics at all. Since the TPNW requires 
nuclear-armed states to implement the denuclearisation process voluntarily and unilaterally, 
all of the nuclear-armed states are hesitant to join the treaty because they do not want to 
denuclearise alone.
200
 Only 70 states have signed on the treaty, and none of the nuclear-
armed states has signed on the treaty. This kind of treaty might have a meaning to arouse the 
international society interest in the importance of nuclear disarmament which has not been 
completed until now for forty-nine years from the effectuation of the NPT. 
However, if no single nuclear-armed state participates to the treaty, the nuclear disarmament 
cannot be achieved, and it does not have any practical help for the world. The author wants to 
suggest some new potential contents for the new NPT regime which can be practically helpful 
to international society. A new NPT is a treaty based on Article VI of the NPT which states the 
obligation for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control. A new NPT regime might be not equal as the TPNW is, but it 
will be more equal than the current NPT regime as the suggestion states the clear road map for 
the nuclear disarmament. This compromise will increase the chance of nuclear-armed states to 
join the treaty. However, it will be a stepwise long-term disarmament process. 
4.1. Proliferation Optimists vs. Proliferation Pessimists 
The NPT aims its goal for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ultimately, pursues 
general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. However, if non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons actually does not contribute to the prevention of nuclear war, analysation on 
the NPT or suggestion for a new NPT regime might be practically useless but only has a 
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meaning for law scholars. Whether the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons actually can be 
helpful for a safer world will be examined. 
Proliferation optimist, Waltz, said the chances of peace rise as the costs of war rise in relation 
to possible gains.
201
 
“If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war with each other, they do so 
knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. (…) In a conventional world, one is 
uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about 
surviving or being annihilated”.202 
As the cost of war is high because of nuclear weapons, states act with more care. As he said, 
there was no full-scale war between nuclear-armed states since 1945. However, nuclear 
deterrence, one out of many factors, cannot explain all aspects of this phenomenon. Concepts 
of collective security or democratic peace theory can be other factors that can explain the 
absence of war between nuclear-armed states.
203
 Allowing more states having nuclear 
weapons according to the one factor out of many other factors is too risky. 
Waltz also argued that “a deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the 
sake of increasing its security, and thus removes a major cause of war”.204 However, this also 
does not work as Waltz expected. As the previous chapters have examined, all nuclear-armed 
states are trying to increase its security by developing more modernised and destructive 
weapons or more sophisticated defence systems.
205
 Nuclear proliferation does not remove the 
necessity of increasing the security of states. 
If there is no nuclear weapon in the world and nuclear energy is guaranteed to be used only 
for peaceful purposes under the strict and effective international control, chances of nuclear 
war will be almost zero. Based on this conclusion, some new contents for the new NPT 
regime will be suggested. 
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4.2. Suggestion of New Contents for the New NPT Regime 
4.2.1. New NWS in the New NPT Regime 
The NWS and the NNWS, a two-tier system, can continue to exist in the new NPT regime 
since the nuclear disarmament obligation should be imposed on nuclear-armed states. In the 
new NPT regime, the author recommends accepting three non-NPT nuclear powers, India, 
Israel and Pakistan. Since those three states have never joined the NPT and have developed 
nuclear weapons in accordance with international law, they should get the same status as the 
current NWS has. Also, the main reason for those three states not joining the NPT is that they 
cannot join the current NPT as the NWS since the definition of the NWS is one which has 
manufactured nuclear weapon before 1 January 1967. Therefore, if they can be accepted as 
the NWS, they probably will join a new NPT.
206
 
However, the last non-NPT nuclear power, the DPRK, should not be accepted as the NWS in 
the new NPT regime. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the DPRK violated 
international law by using the previous assistance from the NPT member states before its 
withdrawal from the NPT for the development of nuclear weapons.
207
 Illegal nuclear 
weapons should not be accepted in the new NPT regime. Therefore, the DPRK should remove 
its nuclear weapons before it enters a new NPT regime and should join as the NNWS. 
4.2.2. New Contents which can be applied in the New NPT Regime 
In this chapter, the author suggests some contents which can be used in the new NPT regime. 
Legal grounds for the new NPT regime is the last part of Article VI of the current NPT. For 
the realistic proposals, only provisions from treaties and existing treaties and policies of states 
are introduced. Although the thesis is focused on the law field, the author believes that 
showing that there are many available realistic options including political options for the new 
NPT regime will be useful for the ones who are looking for a practical solution for the 
nuclear-weapon-free world. 
Firstly, the effectuation of the CTBT can be linked to the effectuation of the new NPT. 
Linking effectuation of new NPT with the CTBT can encourage non-NPT nuclear powers 
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which have not joined the CTBT yet to join the CTBT since joining the new NPT as the NWS 
benefits current non-NPT nuclear powers with the increase of political standings and 
economic benefits as they can join NSG. The CTBT requires ratification of 44 states listed in 
Annex 2 for entry into force.
208
 China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the US have signed but not 
ratified; the DPRK, India and Pakistan have not signed at all. One of the main reasons that 
three non-NPT nuclear powers have not joined the CTBT is the nature of the standstill 
agreement of the CTBT.
209
  
The CTBT does not guarantee the nuclear disarmament of powerful nuclear powers but only 
prohibits the further development of nuclear weapons, and, conclusively, imbalance of nuclear 
capabilities between nuclear-armed states will be stuck. However, if the effectuation of the 
CTBT is the requirement for the new NPT regime which guarantees the nuclear disarmament 
of all nuclear-armed states, the DPRK, India and Pakistan also do not have any reason not to 
join the CTBT. If the new NPT regime’s nuclear disarmament plan cannot be started because 
of few states which have not joined the CTBT, pressure on those few states from international 
society will eventually make them join the CTBT. Also, as three non-NPT nuclear powers, 
India, Israel and Pakistan, will be accepted as the NWS under the new NPT regime, the 
motivation for joining the CTBT and new NPT will be increased. 
Secondly, the principle of assurances of non-use and no first use (NFU) can be introduced. 
The non-use refers to promises given by the NWS vis-à-vis the NNWS. This concept should 
be introduced to make sure that at least the NNWS will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. 
This will lower the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. Also, the NFU concept also can 
be the part of new NPT regime. NFU means that nuclear-armed states will not use nuclear 
weapons unless they were attacked first by enemy state using nuclear weapons. China and 
India already have an NFU policy.
210
 However, Chang argued that the declaring NFU is too 
risky since NATO is not able to defend Baltics with conventional weapons.
211
 Chang pointed 
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out that a NATO war game in 2016, sixty hours was the longest time it took for Russian forces 
to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga.
212
 However, this analysis overestimated the 
influence of nuclear deterrence and regarded it as an only factor which can deter a war. 
Although China has maintained its NFU policy for more than fifty-five years, it is still 
sustainable for China. However, the military capacity of NATO and that of China are not that 
different. Moreover, the war between states, especially between big powers, was deterred not 
only by nuclear weapons but also by other factors such as economic and political reasons. 
Nuclear deterrence is not the only reason why Russia has not attacked Tallinn until now. 
Therefore, adopting NFU cannot be regarded as a risky experiment. 
Thirdly, current nuclear-weapon-free zones can be linked to the new NPT regime for stronger 
protection. The joining of the outer space treaty and seabed arms control treaty can be a 
mandatory requirement to state parties of the new NPT regime. However, as the main purpose 
of the Antarctic treaty is not focused on the restriction on nuclear weapons on the region, 
joining of the Antarctic treaty may not be included in the new NPT regime. 
Also, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Bangkok Treaty, the Treaty of 
Semipalatinsk and the Treaty of Pelindaba can be linked to the new NPT regime.
213
 The 
nuclear-armed states under the new NPT regime should follow these treaties. This will make 
less chance of use of nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. Also, there is a unique 
one-state nuclear-weapon-free zone, Mongolia.
214
 The UNGA resolution recognised the 
declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status internationally.
215
 Although 
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status law is a national law, still, it can be linked with treaties 
if the relevant provision which requires the non-use of nuclear weapons in those zones is 
added as a part of new NPT regime. Therefore, this Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status 
law also can be applied along with other abovementioned laws. Also, the new NPT regime 
can encourage states to legislate a national law which proclaims the nuclear-weapon-free 
status and the provision which automatically recognise this status can be introduced as a part 
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of the new NPT regime. 
Fourthly, the withdrawal clause is recommended. Otherwise, states will hesitate to join the 
treaty. The withdrawal clause will be similar to the TPNW’s withdrawal clause.216 The state 
party will have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. 
The state should give notice of withdrawal twelve months in advance. Additionally, a state 
party, which has announced its withdrawal, undertakes negotiations with other all parties in 
good faith to reconsider its withdrawal decision. However, as the last part of Article 17(3) of 
the TPNW might be interpreted as a restriction on the national sovereignty, continuation of 
the imposition of obligations of the treaty on belligerent states is not recommended to be 
added in the new regime.
217
 
Fifthly, the protection from nuclear terrorism by non-state actors provision can be introduced. 
Although the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) captured nuclear materials in 2014, it 
seems like the ISIL is not able to convert materials into weapons.
218
 Like this case, unlike 
prevalent fear of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, no non-state actor has gained nuclear 
weapons until now. Futter said the least probable way of getting nuclear weapons for terrorist 
groups is manufacturing the nuclear weapons on their own.
219
 Other more probable ways are 
stealing nuclear weapons from nuclear-armed states or getting aid from nuclear-armed 
states.
220
 Based on this analysis, the conclusion can be found that if nuclear disarmament has 
been accomplished according to the new NPT, the risk of nuclear terrorism will be decreased 
dramatically. However, for the more nuclear-safe world, the provision for the protection from 
nuclear terrorism by non-state actors can be introduced. If any state party detects the activity 
of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, all parties to the treaty recognise this issue as a 
challenge to the humankind and deal with this issue in good faith. As a specific method to 
deal with it, linking the UNSC resolution requesting all member states of the UN using armed 
force to counteract the nuclear threat by the non-state actors can be one of the examples. 
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Lastly, specific nuclear disarmament plan should be introduced. According to the Futter, land-
based ICBM is weak at a pre-emptive strike, and cannot be cancelled after the launch. Air-
based nuclear weapons are also weak at air defence network and anti-aircraft weapon. 
However, compared to other nuclear weapons deliveries, SLBM does not have any strategical 
shortcomings. SLBM is just expensive, and it is difficult to develop the technology.
221
 
Therefore, the author wants to suggest the removal of all the nuclear weapons deliveries 
except SLBM. The French Navy nuclear weapons system looks like it is the most effective 
and stable system. “[T]he French Navy maintains a continuous at-sea deterrent posture with at 
least one boat on patrol, one preparing for patrol, one returning to port, and one in 
maintenance”.222 The suggestion for nuclear disarmament system for the new NPT is based 
on this system. 
Ultimately, only the maximum of four SSBNs and forty-eight SLBMs are allowed for the new 
NWS. This number is suggested based on the current number of SLBM of the French Navy. 
The number can be changed based on the agreements between politicians. The author 
recommends MIRV not to be allowed since it can increase the killing power easily. Therefore, 
forty-eight SLBMs are forty-eight nuclear warheads. Other nuclear weapons deliveries and 
nuclear stockpiles (deployed and reserved) are not allowed. The new NWS must disarm their 
nuclear capabilities no later than certain years after entry into force of the new NPT. The due 
date should be decided by politicians. The specific disarmament schedule can be divided into 
many phases like clause from the New START.
223
 Since the current gap between the number 
of nuclear weapons of the US and Russia and those of other nuclear-armed states are huge, 
disarmament schedule can be determined differently. For example, the US and Russia should 
not exceed 350, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers no later 
than thirty-six months after the effectuation of this treaty, while other nuclear-armed states 
should not exceed 50, for same weapons no later than the same date. 
Also, further development and testing of non-SLBM weapons are comprehensively prohibited 
right after the effectuation of new NPT. Development and testing of SLBM-related weapons 
also will be prohibited certain years after the effectuation of new NPT. The determination for 
the period of time is a field of politics. Therefore, nuclear weapons capability certain years 
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after the effectuation of new NPT will be the final level of nuclear capabilities for all nuclear-
armed states. Subcritical test, which is allowed under the CTBT, will be banned certain years 
after the effectuation of new NPT. Therefore, under the new NPT, the NWS enjoy only 
limited rights for the manufacture and the development of nuclear weapons for a while. 
Certain years after the effectuation of new NPT, the NWS only has the right to possess and 
maintain current nuclear weapons. For strict and effective international control, each NWS 
also must accept safeguards.  
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CONCLUSION 
Failure of conclusion of agreement in the US and the DPRK summit in Hanoi in 2019, the 
armed conflicts between two non-NPT nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, the US withdrawal 
of the JCPOA and the recommence of sanctions on Iran by the US and the new nuclear arms 
race are the obstacles that the world face at the moment. Although most of (or some of) 
international law regarding the nuclear weapons have been obeyed by most of the nations, 
some of them have been violated by the NWS and the DPRK. Based on the analyses, some 
new contents which can be applied to the new NPT regime was suggested. 
The first pillar of the NPT, non-proliferation, is the obligation for the NWS not to transfer to 
any recipient nuclear weapons, and not to assist, encourage or induce the NNWS to 
manufacture nuclear weapons. Since the definition of nuclear weapons in the NPT is regarded 
as only nuclear warheads, the missile sales between the US and the UK under the PSA is not 
against the law. 
Regarding the Indian nuclear weapon development, the US violated the non-proliferation 
obligation by leading the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear power in international 
society. The key point of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement is that India would take 
IAEA safeguards of its civil nuclear facilities only, and India is allowed to enter the 
international nuclear market by receiving a waiver from NSG rule. It is difficult to say that the 
US encouraged India to manufacture nuclear weapons, but this recognition as a de facto 
nuclear power itself became an encouragement for other potential nuclear-armed states to 
manufacture nuclear weapons. Although the heaviness of illegality should be evaluated 
differently as the US actively led the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear power, all of 
other NWS also violated the non-proliferation obligation by accepting India entering the NSG 
with exceptional advantages. Because of nature of the unfair system which allows only the 
NWS possessing nuclear weapons, ironically, although non-NPT nuclear powers have 
developed in accordance with the international law outside the NPT regime, the NWS have an 
obligation not to recognise them as de facto nuclear powers inside the NPT regime. 
Regarding the Iranian nuclear weapon development, the US violated the UNSC resolution 
2231 by imposing sanctions on Iran. Since the JCPOA does not bind the US as it is an 
unsigned document, even if the US does not follow the agreement, it is not against anything in 
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the perspective of international law. However, as the UNSC resolution 2231 calls upon all 
member states to take actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the 
JCPOA, the US, the member states of the UN should obey the UNSC resolution. Furthermore, 
as the ICJ ordered in 2018 that the US must lift its sanctions on Iran in accordance with its 
obligations under the 1955 Treaty. Although the US proclaimed its withdrawal from the 1955 
Treaty, the US still has an obligation to lift its sanctions on Iran as illegal acts of the US have 
happened before the proclamation of its withdrawal. 
Article VI of the NPT states three obligations to the NWS to pursue negotiations in good faith: 
cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament. According to the decision of the Arbitration Tribunals, an 
abnormal delay is a case of violation of the rules of good faith. An obligation to negotiate 
does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement according to the Advisory Opinion of 
PCIJ. However, considering the mention of the phrase, at an early date, in the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race part, this part should have been observed already. Otherwise, abnormal 
delay of forty-nine years will be the evidence of a violation of the rules of good faith. 
Although the quantity of nuclear warheads of most of the NWS (except China) has been 
decreased, the quality of nuclear weapons, especially nuclear weapons deliveries, has been 
researched and developed until now by all NWS. Furthermore, the US withdrawal of the 
ABM Treaty spurred new nuclear arms race as it led the Russian withdrawal of START II. 
The CTBT has not been ratified by two NWS, China and the US. The author concludes that 
all NWS violated their obligations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race part in several 
ways. Nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament have been complied by no NWS as they even have not kept obligation for the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race. 
Regarding the legality of use of nuclear weapons under international law, according to the ICJ 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and each judge’s individual opinions on this matter, 
although the ICJ gave up to give an answer whether the use of nuclear weapons can be legal 
or not, seven judges out of fourteen expressed their opinion separately that the use of nuclear 
weapon itself cannot be complied with international law because of its tremendous power. 
Also, since nuclear weapons cannot distinguish civilian and military targets and cannot avoid 
unnecessary suffering, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be legal always under the 
international humanitarian law. Moreover, Article 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional 
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Protocol I which prohibits the use of means of warfare which are intended or expected to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment will be violated 
automatically if any kinds of nuclear weapons are used as their harm on natural environment 
is serious enough to breach the international environmental law all the time. 
Regarding the non-NPT nuclear powers, as India, Israel and Pakistan have not joined the NPT, 
developments of nuclear weapons by those states are not against international law. However, 
in the DPRK case, although its withdrawal from the NPT was conducted in accordance with 
Article X of the NPT, its development of nuclear weapons itself is against international law 
since the DPRK started to develop nuclear weapons before its withdrawal from the NPT. 
Moreover, as an NPT member, the DPRK had received assistance from other NPT members, 
and as this assistance must be used for the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons, the 
development of nuclear weapons of the DPRK is against the international law for sure, and it 
should not be accepted as the NWS in the new regime. 
Some new contents for the new NPT regime were suggested based on the analyses from the 
previous three chapters. The new NPT regime is expected to be concluded according to the 
last part of Article VI which mentions the treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control. India, Israel and Pakistan can be accepted as the new 
NWS since they have developed nuclear weapons without the violation of international law 
while the DPRK should implement its total denuclearisation and re-join the new NPT as the 
NNWS since its development is illegal from the beginning. 
The effectuation of new NPT can be linked to the CTBT since the CTBT requires the 
ratifications of all nuclear-relevant states for its effectuation, all nuclear-armed states can start 
nuclear disarmament process at the same time. Assurances of non-use to the NNWS and NFU 
concept can be applied as an obligation for the NWS. Current nuclear-weapon-free zones also 
can be linked to the new NPT regime for more safety. Also, one-state nuclear-weapon-free 
zone like Mongolian case can be encouraged, and they can be linked to the new regime as 
well. The withdrawal clause is advised to be introduced to encourage states to join the new 
regime. However, it is recommended to require a notice of a longer period than three months 
in advance its withdrawal. Also, the obligation to enter negotiations with other parties in good 
faith to reconsider its withdrawal after the announcement of withdrawal can be introduced. 
Since SLBM is the most effective nuclear weapons delivery, removing all other nuclear 
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weapons deliveries except SLBM was suggested. The process of nuclear disarmament can be 
done step by step. 
Nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. However, international concern on nuclear 
weapons has existed all the time. Since the NPT has an unequal system which allows one 
group to possess nuclear weapons whereas the other group is not allowed to have nuclear 
weapons, it has fundamental illogical contradictions. As Article VI of the NPT states the 
general and complete disarmament of all nuclear weapons, we can infer the temporary system 
of the NPT. However, since 1970, the effectuation of the NPT, there is no clear and specific 
nuclear disarmament plan. The most certain way to be free from the fear of nuclear weapons 
is the total removal of nuclear weapons of all states. The author hopes this thesis is helpful to 
remind the importance of the total denuclearisation of all states and is useful to find concrete 
and sophisticated way for the general and complete nuclear disarmament under strict and 
effective international control.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
ABM Treaty - Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
ALCM - Air-Launched Cruise Missiles 
CTBT - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
DPRK - Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
ENDC - Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
ICJ - International Court of Justice 
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
JCPOA - Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
JDDKP - Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
LEP - Life Extension Programmes  
MIRV - Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles 
NAM - Non-Aligned Movement 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NFU - No First Use 
NNWS - Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion - Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 
Advisory Opinion 
NWS - Nuclear Weapon States 
PCIJ - Permanent Court of International Justice 
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PLA Navy - People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PSA - Polaris Sales Agreement 
PTBT - Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
ROK - Republic of Korea 
SLBM - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
SSBN - Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines 
START II - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II  
TPNW - Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
UK - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC - United Nations Security Council 
US - United States of America 
US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement - Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy 
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VCLT - Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
1955 Treaty - Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United 
States of America and Iran  
65 
 
REFERENCES 
Books 
1. Futter. A. The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (Korean Edition). London: SAGE Publications 
2015, Myung In Publishers 2016. 
2. Joyner. D. H. The legal meaning and implications of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. - G. Nystuen et al. Nuclear Weapons Under International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014. 
3. Koppe. E. V. Use of nuclear weapons and protection of the environment during 
international armed conflict. - G. Nystuen et al. Nuclear Weapons Under International Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
4. Lodgaard. S. Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: towards a nuclear free world? 
Abingdon: Routledge Global Security Studies 2011. 
5. Miller. S. Proliferation, disarmament and the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, - M. B. 
Maerli., S. Lodgaard. Nuclear proliferation and international security. Abingdon: Routledge 
Global Security Studies 2007. 
6. Nystuen. G., Hugo. T. G. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. - G. Nystuen et al. Nuclear 
Weapons Under International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
7. Paddock. C. India-US Nuclear Deal: Prospects & Implications. New Delhi: Epitome Books 
2009. 
8. Popp. R. The long road to the NPT: from superpower collusion to global compromise. – R. 
Popp, L. Horovitz, A. Wenger (ed). Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. London 
and New York: Routledge 2017. 
9. Waltz. K. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Papers, no. 17. 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1981. 
Journal Articles 
10. Burns. E. L. M. The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiations and Prospects. – 23 
International Organization 1969(4). 
11. Coppen. T. Good faith and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. – 2 Questions of 
International Law 2014. 
12. Falk. R. Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: a Historic encounter. – 
91 American Journal of International Law 1997(64). 
13. Fry. J. D. Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive Disarmament 
66 
 
Measures and Their Legal Implication. – 29 Michigan Journal of International law 2008(2). 
14. Gleditsch. N. P. Democracy and Peace. – 29 Journal of Peace Research 1992(4). 
15. Greenwood. C. The law of weaponry at the start of the new millennium. – 71 International 
Law Studies 1998. 
16. Kristensen. H. M., Korda. M. French nuclear forces, 2019 – 75 Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 2019(1). 
17. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S. Chinese nuclear forces, 2018 – 74 Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 2018(4). 
18. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S. Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013. – 69 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2013(5). 
19. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S. Russian nuclear forces, 2018 – 74 Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 2018(3). 
20. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S. The British nuclear stockpile, 1953-2013 – 69 Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists 2013(4). 
21. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S. United States nuclear forces, 2018 – 74 Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 2018(2). 
22. Pfaltzgraff. R. L., JR. The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. – 30, Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs 2006(3). 
23. Priest. A. In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 
1962–1968. – 19 Contemporary British History 2006(3). 
24. Smith. T. C. Arms Race Instability and War. – 24 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 1980. 
25. Tannenwald. N. The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? How Disarmament Fell Apart. – 97 
Foreign Affairs 2018(6). 
26. Wadhva. C. D. Cost of Economic Sanctions Aftermath of Pokhran II. – 33 Economic and 
Political Weekly 1998. 
27. Waltz. K. N. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better. – 21 The Adelphi Papers 
1981(171). 
28. Warner. D. The Nuclear Weapons Decision by the International Court of Justice: Locating 
the raison behind raison d’état. – 27 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1998(2). 
29. Willrich. M. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology 
Confronts World Politics. – 77 Yale Law Journal 1968(8). 
30. Zala. B. How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one. – 75 Bulletin 
67 
 
of the Atomic Scientists 2019(1). 
Treaties 
31. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty. Pelindaba 11.04.1996, e.i.f. 15.07.2009. 
32. Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (US-India Civil Nuclear 
Agreement). 27.07.2007, not yet ratified. 
33. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
Vienna 30.01.1992, e.i.f. 10.04.1992. 
34. Annex to the Convention: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
Hague 18.10.1907, e.i.f. 01.26.1910, Regulations. 
35. Antarctic Treaty. Washington, D. C. 01.12.1959, e.i.f. 23.06.1961. 
36. Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone. Semipalatinsk 08.09.2006, e.i.f. 21.03.2009. 
37. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco 06.26.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945. 
38. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). New York, 10.09.1996, not yet ratified. 
39. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the acquisition by the United 
Kingdom of the Trident II Weapon System under the Polaris Sales Agreement signed on 6 
April 1963. Washington, 19 October 1982, Washington DC 19.10.1982, e.i.f. 19.10.1982. 
40. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Washington, D.C. 08.12.1987, e.i.f. 
01.06.1988, expired 01.02.2019 by the United States and expired 02.02.2019 by Russia. 
41. Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). Moscow 05.08.1963, e.i.f. 10.10.1963. 
42. Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA). Washington DC 06.04.1963, e.i.f. 06.04.1963. 
43. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977 Additional Protocol I). Geneva 
08.06.1977, e.i.f. 07.12.1977. 
44. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva 17.06.1925, e.i.f. 08.02.1928. 
45. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Rarotonga 06.08.1985, e.i.f. 11.12.1986. 
46. Statute of the IAEA. New York 23.10.1956, e.i.f. 29.07.1957. 
47. Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
68 
 
48. Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. 
Moscow 05.08.1963, e.i.f. 10.10.1963. 
49. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Moscow 03.01.1993, e.i.f. 14.04.2000. 
(Russia withdrawal 14.06.2002.). 
50. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for 
the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). Prague 
08.04.2010, e.i.f. 02.05.2011. 
51. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions. Moscow 24.05.2002, e.i.f. 01.06.2003. (Expired 05.02.2011) 
52. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Moscow 26.05.1972, e.i.f. 03.10.1972. 
(The US withdrawal 13.06.2002). 
53. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. (START I) Moscow 31.07.1991, 
e.i.f. 05.12.1994. (Expired 05.12.2009.) 
54. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Mexico City 14.02.1967, e.i.f. 22.04.1968. 
55. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights. Signed at Tehran, on 15 
August 1955. Tehran 15.08.1955, e.i.f. 16.06.1957. 
56. Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. Moscow, London and Washington, D. C. 
27.01.1967. 
57. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moscow, London and 
Washington DC 01.07.1968., e.i.f. 05.03.1970. 
58. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). New York 07.07.2017, not yet 
ratified. 
59. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of 
Mass Destruction on the seabed the Ocean Floor and in the subsoil Thereof. Washington, D. 
C., London and Moscow 11.02.1971, e.i.f. 18.05.1972. 
60. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Bangkok 15.12.1995, e.i.f. 
28.03.1997. 
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Vienna 23.05.1969, e.i.f. 27.01.1980, 
Art 34 and Art 38. 
69 
 
National Legislation 
62. 대한민국헌법 (Constitution of the Republic of Korea). Amended 29.10.1987, e.i.f. 
25.02.1988. Art 4 and 5. 
63. Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status. Adopted 25.09.1992, e.i.f. 03.02.2000. 
Judicial Practice 
64. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order, I.C.J. Reports 2018. 
65. Constitutional Court of Korea, 26.02.2004, 2001HunMa718. 
66. Lagrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports. 
27.06.2001. 
67. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), Award of the Arbitration Tribunal, 16.11.1957. 
68. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), 
Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1996. 
69. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Judge Ferrari Bravo. 
70. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Judge Herczegh. 
71. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Judge Shi. 
72. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin. 
73. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Declaration of President Bedjaoui. 
74. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins. 
75. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma. 
76. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda 
77. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel. 
78. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
79. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry. 
80. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Fleischhauer. 
81. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume. 
82. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva. 
83. Oil Platforms Case. (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, 
70 
 
I.C.J. Reports. 12.12.1996. 
84. Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač (Judgement), IT-06-90-A, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 16.11.2012. 
85. Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač (Judgement), IT-06-90-A, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Fausto Poscar. 
86. Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač (Judgement), IT-06-90-T, 
ICTY, 15.04.2011. 
87. Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, Permanent Court of 
International Justice, 15.10.1931. 
88. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States of America v. 
Iran), advisory opinions and order, I.C.J. Reports. 24.05.1980. 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
89. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, 06.06.1998. 
90. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695, 15.07.2006. 
91. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, 31.07.2006. 
92. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, 23.12.2006. 
93. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747, 24.03.2007. 
94. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803, 03.03.2008. 
95. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, 27.09.2008. 
96. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, 09.06.2010. 
97. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984, 09.06.2011. 
98. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2049, 07.06.2012. 
99. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2105, 05.06.2013. 
100. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2159, 09.06.2014. 
101. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, 20.07.2015. 
Non-Binding Agreements and Resolutions 
102. Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Geneva 21.10.1994. 
71 
 
103. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Vienna 14.07.2015 (created), e.i.f. 18.10.2015 
(adoption). 16.01.01 (implementation). 
104. Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 20.01.1992, declared 
19.02.1992. 
105. United Nations Disarmament Commission Resolution DC/225. 15.06.1965. 
106. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028. 19.11.1965. 
107. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/33. 12.01.2001. 
Reports 
108. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China 2017. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 15.05.2017. 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF 
(28.02.2019). 
109. Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/32, 06.06.2003. 
110. Implementation of the NPT safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/75, 10.11.2003. 
111. Implementation of the NPT safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2005/70, 24.09.2005. 
112. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Deterrent. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. 
04.12.2006. 
Newspaper Articles and Press Releases 
113. Bagchi. I. India sees red as China voices n-deal concerns. The Times of India, 
02.09.2008. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-sees-red-as-China-voices-n-deal-
concerns/articleshow/3433914.cms?referral=PM (15.02.2019). 
114. Borak. D., Gaouette. N. US officially reimposes all sanctions lifted under 2015 Iran 
nuclear deal. CNN. 05.11.2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/05/politics/iran-
sanctions/index.html (25.02.2019). 
115. Borger. J. Donald Trump confirms US withdrawal from INF nuclear treaty. The Guardian, 
01.02.2019 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/01/inf-donald-trump-confirms-us-
withdrawal-nuclear-treaty (22.03.2019). 
116. Busvine. D. Modi says committed to no first use of nuclear weapons. Reuters. 
16.04.2014. https://in.reuters.com/article/uk-india-election-nuclear/modi-says-committed-to-
no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons-idINKBN0D20QB20140416 (16.03.2019). 
72 
 
117. China refuses to budge, says India must sign NPT to gain entry into NSG. The Indian 
Express, 31.01.2019. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/india-must-sign-npt-to-gain-
entry-into-nuclear-suppliers-group-china-refuses-to-dilute-stand-5563168/ (15.02.2019). 
118. Ellyatt. H. Putin reveals new Russian missile that can ‘reach any point in the world’. 
CNBC. 01.03.2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/putin-new-russia-missile-nuclear.html 
(25.01.2019). 
119. Gorbachev. M. Opinion Mikhail Gorbachev: A New Nuclear Arms Race Has Begun. The 
New York Times, 25.10.2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/opinion/mikhail-
gorbachev-inf-treaty-trump-nuclear-arms.html (24.01.2019). 
120. Kruzel. J. What you need to know ahead of Donald Trump’s Iran deal deadline. 
POLITIFACT. 03.05.2018. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2018/may/03/what-you-need-know-ahead-donald-trumps-iran-deal-d/ 
(24.02.2019). 
121. Landler. M. Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned. The New York Times, 
08.05.2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-
deal.html (24.02.2019). 
122. Liptak. K., Diamond. J. ‘Sometimes you have to walk’: Trump leaves Hanoi with no deal. 
CNN 28.02.2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/27/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-
vietnam-summit/index.html (06.03.2019). 
123. Panda. A. China Conducts First Test of New JL-3 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile. 
The Diplomat, 20.12.2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/china-conducts-first-test-of-new-
jl-3-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile/ (16.01.2019). 
124. Reevell. P. Russia has tested new nuclear missile that NATO calls ‘Satan 2’. ABC NEWS. 
30.03.2018. https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-tested-nuclear-
missile/story?id=54123222 (25.01.2019). 
125. Regan. H. et al. Pakistan says it shot down two Indian jets as Kashmir border crisis 
deepens. CNN, 28.02.2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/27/india/india-pakistan-strikes-
escalation-intl/index.html (06.03.2019). 
126. Sherlock. R. Iraq jihadists seize ‘nuclear material’, says ambassador to UN. The 
Telegraph 10.07.2014. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10958388/Iraq-jihadists-seize-
nuclear-material-says-ambassador-to-UN.html (17.03.2019). 
127. Sirohi. S. A win-win situation for India. BBC, 09.10.2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7650286.stm (13.02.2019). 
128. Stubley. P. Putin threatens to build new missiles after Trump pulls US out of Cold War-
73 
 
era nuclear weapons treaty. The Independent, 02.02.2019 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-russia-us-cold-war-trump-nuclear-
weapons-missiles-treaty-arms-race-military-a8759616.html (11.02.2019). 
129. Tran. P. France makes progress on refitting submarine for M51 missiles. Defense News, 
23.07.2018. Accessible: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/07/23/france-makes-
progress-on-refitting-submarine-for-m51-missiles/ (10.01.2019). 
130. U.S. imposes sanctions on india. CNN, 13.05.1998. 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/ (13.02.2019). 
131. U.S. lifts sanctions against India. CNN, 05.12.2001. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/12/04/india.us.defense/index.html 
(13.02.2019). 
132. Zerbor. L. India and the CTBT. The Hindu, 31.08.2016. 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/india-and-the-ctbt/article6892680.ece 
(17.03.2019). 
133. Zhaohui. D. China upgrades missile force, adds space and cyber war forces. China 
Military Online, 01.01.2016. http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-
reports/2016-01/01/content_6840094.htm (16.03.2019). 
Others 
134. ABM Treaty Fact Sheet, The White House President George W. Bush, 13.12.2001, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html 
(01.03.2019). 
135. Bruno. G., Iran’s Nuclear Program, Council on Foreign Relations, 10.03.2010 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-nuclear-program (23.02.2019). 
136. Chang. G. G. Declaring a no-first-use nuclear policy would be exceedingly risky. 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 27.07.2016. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160728162546/http://thebulletin.org/declaring-no-first-use-
nuclear-policy-would-be-exceedingly-risky9689 (16.03.2019). 
137. Dehghan. S. K., Borger. J. International court of justice orders US to lift new Iran 
sanctions. The Guardian, 03.10.2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/03/international-court-of-justice-orders-us-to-
lift-new-iran-sanctions (27.02.2019). 
138. Encourage Law and Legal Definition, US Legal, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/encourage/ (12.02.2019). 
139. Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards 
74 
 
(27.02.2019). 
140. Fundamental Principles of IHL, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl (11.03.2019). 
141. ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: 
Commentary, 1973. 
142. Iran (Islamic Republic of): Ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/iran%28islamicrepublicof%29/rat/washington 
(22.02.2019). 
143. Joyner. D. H. Iran’s nuclear program and the legal mandate of the IAEA. Jurist, 
09.11.2011. https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2011/11/dan-joyner-iaea-report/ (28.01.2019). 
144. KCNA 'Detailed Report' Explains NPT Withdrawal, Federation of American Scientists, 
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk012203.html (14.03.2019). 
145. Kimball. D., The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a Glance, Arms Control Association, 
16.08.2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG (12.02.2019). 
146. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S., PLOUGHSHARES FUND, 28.09.2018, 
https://www.ploughshares.org/world-nuclear-stockpile-report (08.12.2018). 
147. Kristensen. H. M., Norris. R. S., Status of World Nuclear Forces, Federation of American 
Scientists, 2018, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/, 
(06.12.2018). 
148. Kristensen. H. M., China’s Noisy Nuclear Submarines, Federation of American 
Scientists, 21.11.2009, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2009/11/subnoise/, (16.01.2019). 
149. Kristensen. H. M., McKinzie. M., Postol. T. A., How US nuclear force modernization is 
undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 01.03.2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/03/how-us-nuclear-force-
modernization-is-undermining-strategic-stability-the-burst-height-compensating-super-fuze/, 
(14.12.2018). 
150. Majumdar. D., Russia's Nuclear Weapons Buildup Is Aimed at Beating U.S. Missile 
Defenses. The National Interest, 01.03.2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-
nuclear-weapons-buildup-aimed-beating-us-missile-24716 (01.03.2019). 
151. Military necessity, ICRC, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity 
(12.03.2019). 
152. Mulligan. S. P. Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris 
Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement. Congressional Research Service. 04.05.2018. 
75 
 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761.pdf. (26.02.2019). 
153. Nukemap, The College of Arts and Letters, Stevens Institute of Technology, 
https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ (12.03.2019). 
154. Pampe. C. 20th Air Force, United States Air Force, 26.10.2012, 
https://www.20af.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/457746/life-extension-programs-send-
missiles-into-the-future/ (24.01.2019). 
155. Persbo. A. A reflection on the current state of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards. 
SIPRI. 2012. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Nonproliferation8.pdf (19.03.2019). 
156. Policy paper Dreadnought submarine programme: factsheet, Government of the United 
Kingdom, 19.02.2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/successor-submarine-
programme-factsheet/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet (12.12.2018). 
157. Proportionality, ICRC, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/proportionality (12.03.2019). 
158. Squassoni. S. A. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and 
Pakistan. CRS Report for Congresss. 28.11.2006. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf 
(14.03.2019). 
159. Statement by B. Laggner, representative of Switzerland. 3rd meeting of First Committee 
69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. New York. 08.10.2014. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gadis3498.doc.htm  (11.02.2019). 
160. Statement by D. Trump, President of the United States of America. General Debate of 
the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. New York. 19.09.2017. 
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/us_en.pdf (01.02.2019). 
161. Statement by E. Yusup, Cluster 1 Specific Issues: Nuclear disarmament and security 
assurance, to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for 2015 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 25.04.2013. 
162. Statement by Y. H. Ri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea. General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. New 
York. 23.09.2017. https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/kp_en.pdf 
(01.02.2019). 
163. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ (01.02.2019). 
164. Unnecessary suffering, ICRC, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/unnecessary-suffering 
(01.04.2019). 
165. Vavasseur. X. Here is the First Image of the French Navy Next Generation SSBN – 
SNLE 3G. Navy Recognition, 03.10.2018. Accessible: 
76 
 
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/october-2018-navy-
naval-defense-news/6538-here-is-the-first-image-of-the-french-navy-next-generation-ssbn-
snle-3g.html (10.01.2019). 
166. Wolfsthal. J. B et al. The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad US Strategic Nuclear 
Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies. 2014.  
77 
 
Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public 
 
I, Inhyuk Suh, 
1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to reproduce, 
for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the 
expiry of the term of copyright, 
 
Breaches of International Law regarding Nuclear Weapons and Suggestions for the New NPT 
Regime, 
supervised by René Värk, dr. iur. 
 
2.    I grant the University of Tartu a permit to make the work specified in p. 1 available to 
the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace 
digital archives, under the Creative Commons licence CC BY NC ND 3.0, which allows, 
by giving appropriate credit to the author, to reproduce, distribute the work and 
communicate it to the public, and prohibits the creation of derivative works and any 
commercial use of the work until the expiry of the term of copyright. 
 
3.  I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1 and 2. 
 
4.  I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons’ 
intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.  
 
Inhyuk Suh 
29/04/2019 
